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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Theorists in psychology have long recognized internal conflicts as central to the 
development and maintenance of personal identity, and as a potential source for distress.  
Freud (1923) conceptualized the human psyche as comprised of three components, the id, 
the ego, and the superego, which Bettleheim (1982) referred to as the “it,” the “I,” and 
the “Upper-I.”  Intrapsychic conflict in which the “I” functions as mediator between the 
base instincts of the “it,” and the lofty moral demands of the “Upper-I,” are said to lead 
not only to various and sundry symptoms, but also to the development, and in fact, 
betterment of both individuals and society (Freud, 1961).  One’s “ego defenses” then, 
commonly solely understood as the source of unpleasant symptoms, are one and the same 
as one’s “ego strengths.”   
The entanglement of internal conflict and identity is seen throughout the writings 
of social cognitivists Festinger and Heider, both “go-to” theorists in the area of internal 
conflicts.  Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is, at the heart, a recognition 
that personal identity develops and changes in and through the resolution of internal 
conflicts as a means for protecting the coherence of the Self.  If, for instance, a man finds 
that he is engaging in behaviors that are contrary to the behaviors in which he
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should engage based upon how he perceives himself, he will be compelled to change 
either his behavior, or his self-perception (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).  A change in 
attitude, often easier to implement than a change in behavior, provides a means for escape 
from the distress of this conflict.  
 Likewise, Heider’s balance theory (1958) observes that humans are more 
comfortable when there is no conflict between love and hate, between for and against.  If 
a person holds a favorable attitude towards another person, for example, he or she will be 
more comfortable when the other person holds a similar attitude towards a third 
object/person (given the salience of the object.)  A contradiction calls into question either 
the person’s attitude of the other person, or the person’s attitude of the object/person at 
hand, both parts of the former person’s self-identity.  In order to reach a level of 
maximum comfort, one or the other must be altered, thus altering personal identity to 
some degree.  In Heider’s published notes, he denounces the term balance as a concept in 
which tension is often implicit (Benesh-Weiner, 1989).  While balance or striking some 
kind compromise between the two attitudes might preserve coherence of identity, it does 
not provide maximum comfort, but exacts some cost. 
Despite widespread acknowledgment of internal conflicts as threats to identity 
coherence, and thus a source of psychological distress, work in this area has remained 
largely theoretical, and definitions of internal conflicts vague.  Personal Construct Theory 
(PCT) developed by American theorist George Kelly (1955), provides a means for 
operationalizing/identifying internal conflicts, making the concept accessible for use in 
various modes and manners of research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Personal Construct Theory 
Man’s world is manifold, and his attitudes are manifold.  
What is manifold is often frightening because it is not neat and 
simple.  Men prefer to forget how many possibilities are open to 
them.  They like to be told that there are two worlds and two ways.  
This is comforting because it is so tidy.  Almost always one way 
turns out to be common and the other one celebrated as superior.   
                              
 -Martin Buber’s I and Thou (1970, p. 9.) 
 
 Though Kelly is not commonly known as an existentialist, the above excerpt from 
existentialist philosopher Buber’s I and Thou might very well serve as a summary of the 
spirit of Personal Construct Theory. At the heart of Kelly’s theory is the concept of 
constructive alternativism.  According to this, for every meaning or interpretation that 
might be applied to some thing or event, there are endless alternative interpretations that 
may be reached.  For Kelly, every person is a scientist and a philosopher.  Thrust into a 
world of dizzying possibility, of endless interpretations, we crave order, for without 
order, relativity appears before us as chaos.  As scientists, we seek to discern patterns 
within the apparent chaos of constructive alternativism.  As philosophers, we seek 
meaning within the patterns.  Seeing, or choosing to see one pattern or meaning implies
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not seeing or choosing not to see all the other patterns or meanings that may have been 
discerned in its place.  In this way, the person-scientist is both looking for laws and 
creating laws, not ex nihilo, but rather out of endless possibilities of lawfulness.  In true 
scientific fashion, people form hypotheses from series of observations, tests them for 
validity, and adjusts and discards them as they are shown to be insufficient.  For Kelly 
(1955) the building blocks of humankind’s hypotheses are bipolar constructs, which serve 
as a dialectical classification system for all things we encounter.  Isolated constructs are 
insufficient towards organization and thus anticipation of events in the world; after all, 
the goal of the person-scientist is not simply classification, but rather anticipation.  
Towards that end, the person-scientist organizes his or her constructs in relation to one 
another in such a way that they form a network, which Kelly refers to as a construct 
system, whereby single or multiple constructs imply or predict the presence of other 
construct(s). 
 In his Personal Construct Theory (1955), Kelly lays out 11 corollaries, all based 
upon his Fundamental Postulate explicitly describing the process of building and 
adjusting a construction system.  Of the 11 corollaries, 6 will be described as they are 
directly relevant to the topic of internal conflict.  The fundamental postulate states that “a 
person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates 
events,” (1955, p. 46).  One might read this to mean simply that people act in ways that 
make sense to them.  Events in the world travel into each person’s awareness by means of 
his or her construct system and each event is interpreted via his or her construct system, 
and he or she responds only to that interpretation.  Though he or she is, therefore, creator 
of his or her own subjective world, events in his or her world nonetheless appear to 
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him/her as occurring independently from his or her construal.  That is to say, though the 
person-scientist is a lawful being, that which guides and restricts his or her perception 
and behavior are his or her very own theories, which he or she has forged from a 
multitude of possible theories and reified as law in an attempt to create order where none 
was apparent.  Kelly is clear that the person-scientist does not literally create the factual 
material of his experiences, but only interprets it. Constructs are not identical to objective 
things or events, but rather representations of them.  Material events (e.g. people, places, 
things) are referred to as elements, (p. 137) and though they are not factually altered by 
humankind’s constructs, we can see them only through our own lenses.  In this way, the 
only reality available to each individual is reality for him or her. Largely unaware of his 
constructs as such, “man can enslave himself with his own ideas and [must] then win his 
freedom again by reconstruing his life” (Kelly, 1955, p. 21.)    The suggestion of differing 
individual realities should not imply that Kelly’s theory is one of relativism, for he does 
acknowledge the existence of elements independent of a construct system.  Rather, what 
he is suggesting is, at root, a theory of relativity because people are simply experiencing 
the world relative to their own position.  We are not constructing our worlds in the 
strictest sense of the term, but rather co-constructing the world.  After all, in order for the 
person-scientist to construe an element, there must exist some element to construe. 
 The first corollary to the fundamental postulate Kelly proposes is the Construction 
Corollary: “A person anticipates events by construing their replication” (1955, p. 50).  
The most basic way in which the person-scientist builds a construct system is by 
observing events in the world and reasoning that they are more likely to occur again 
given the same circumstances than all the other events that did not occur. According to 
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Kelly’s third corollary, the Organization Corollary, “each person characteristically 
evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing 
ordinal relationships between constructs” (p. 56).  This corollary begins Kelly’s 
discussion of how various constructs become and stay connected.  For ease of 
explanation, it is beneficial to combine the discussion of the Organization Corollary with 
that of Kelly’s fourth corollary, the Dichotomy Corollary, which states that “a person’s 
construction system is composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs” (p. 59.)  
The combination of these two corollaries tells us several important things; first, it tells us 
that every expectation carries with it its implied opposite.  Secondly, it tells us that some 
of these poles are either associated with a single pole of another construct, or may be 
divided according to a bipolar construct.  Consider for example, Stanley who, like many 
people, acknowledges that certain things are good, which implies, according to the 
Dichotomy Corollary, the existence of certain things that are not good or bad.   When 
confronted with a woman he deems good, Stanley might, according to the Organization 
Corollary, assume that she is also honest, implying that she is not dishonest.  In this case, 
the construct of good v. bad functions as a superordinate construct of honest v. dishonest.  
Superordinate constructs are constructs which can be further broken down into constructs 
referred to as subordinate constructs (p. 136).  This hierarchical system is analogous to 
the taxonomical classification system used to classify species and subspecies of living 
organisms.  Take for instance, the bonobo (pan paniscus) and the common chimpanzee 
(pan troglodytes).  They belong to the same classifications from kingdom through genus, 
but belong to different species.  Genus (pan) serves as a superordinate construct for 
species (paniscus and troglodytes.)  Furthermore, kingdom (animalia) serves as a 
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superordinate subtype for both genus and species (Fleagle, 1988).  In the same way, for 
Stanley, good serves as a superordinate construct for honest, and honesty is construed as 
a subtype of goodness.  Superordinate constructs in the context of this hierarchical 
arrangement have a wider range of convenience than do subordinate constructs, meaning 
that they can be used to construe many more different elements than can subordinate 
constructs that are more specialized.  Kelly does discuss other ways in which constructs 
may be hierarchically organized.  For example, rather than a whole bipolar construct 
being further defined into two narrower constructs, single poles of constructs may be 
regularly associated with other constructs or portions of other constructs which are not 
narrower categories of the superordinate construct.  While Stanley’s construct good v. not 
good encompasses the subordinate construct honest v. dishonest, not good may also be 
singly correlated with the undesired pole of his construct working class v. upper class.  It 
is this type of hierarchical relationship, in which a single pole of one construct predicts, 
or implies the single pole of another construct that is of greatest interest to the current 
study. 
 Personal Construct Theory makes it very clear that human beings are active in 
creating and sustaining their own worlds.  One implication of this is that the person-
scientist can limit the scope of his or her worldview by constricting his or her 
construction system or widening it by allowing expansion of the system.  The Modulation 
Corollary states that “the variation in a person’s construction system is limited by the 
permeability of the constructs within whose range of convenience the variants lie” (Kelly, 
1955, p. 77).  In order for a new event to be construed or “made to seem regular” (p. 76), 
it must fall into the range of convenience of a pre-existing construct- there must be a 
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place for it.  New elements come into the focus of our construction system through the 
elaboration of existing constructs. Some constructs with a small range of convenience, 
are said to be impermeable, as they are relatively specialized and thus less able to 
accommodate new elements.  Constructs that are abstract tend to be more permeable than 
constructs that are concrete.  A person who sees only in proverbial black and white will 
experience a world that is more constricted than a person whose construction system is 
able to accommodate for shades of grey.  Finally, according to Kelly’s Fragmentation 
Corollary, one may easily operate using a construction system partially comprised of two 
or more subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with one another (1955, see p. 
83).  It is only when the incompatibilities are brought into focus that fragmentation of 
one’s construction system becomes problematic.   
Kellian Conflict 
Ideally, one’s personal construct system is rigid enough to provide structure to an 
otherwise chaotic world, and yet flexible enough to incorporate new information.  
However, due to the sometimes delicate balance of ordinal relationships, it can be 
distressing to adjust those subsystems that are central or foundational to one’s construct 
system, even when they are shown to be insufficient or contradictory.  Anyone who has 
ever built or purchased a house knows that it is generally much easier and cheaper to 
replace small things (doorknobs, carpet), peripheral things (siding, windowpanes), or 
even uppermost parts of the house such as the roof, than it is to replace, repair, or 
rearrange the home’s load bearing structures.  So, for the person-scientist, when a 
superordinate construct is called into question, it can potentially threaten the structure of 
his or her entire construct system.  When some life event reveals a relevant portion of 
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one’s construct system to be insufficient, the weakness may be fixed, ignored or justified.  
Inconsistencies in one’s construct system, though at times tolerable, can become 
confusing or even upsetting when the constructs involved are both highly valued as a 
means for anticipation.  Consider again Stanley above, for whom the bipolar construct 
good v. not good has proven quite useful in the past.  His experiences have led him to 
believe that people who are good are most often also honest.  If he has always relied upon 
the goodness of his mother, it might be quite shocking to Stanley if he hears her tell a lie.  
If Mother is good, but also dishonest, depending upon the extent to which Stanley needs, 
for the sake of stability, for Mother to remain good, he is likely to find himself in a state 
of conflict.  He has several choices.  If Mother is to remain good, Stanley must reevaluate 
the construct good v. not good as anticipatory of honest v. dishonest.  If it is not too 
distressing, he may also adjust his view of Mother and see her now as not good.  He may 
also ignore the contradiction, or see the anticipatory weakness of the constructs as an 
anomaly, or he may free himself from the discomfort of seeing Mother as not good or 
dishonest by increasing the permeability of either construct.  One can imagine many 
additional ways in which Stanley might resolve or justify this anticipatory insufficiency 
in his construct system, including, of course, refusing to acknowledge the inconsistency 
as insufficiency and seeing Mother as both not good and dishonest.  Clinging to one’s 
construct system is common when the person-scientist is faced with conflict.  It is not 
uncommon, according to Kelly, for someone in the midst of such a conflict to tighten 
(make less permeable) existing subordinate constructs.  This provides a short if 
unsustainable reprieve from the potentially destabilizing effects of conflict by allowing 
the person-scientist to continue anticipating events via the use of relatively few, but also 
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relatively unambiguous constructs while the person tweaks and rebuilds higher-level 
superordinate constructs.  Much like the use of a back-up generator, a tightened construct 
system allows the person-scientist to function at a diminished capacity, but greatly limits 
his or her anticipatory power. 
Though conflict may arise in response to any number of conceivable weaknesses 
of one’s construct system, perhaps the most distressing arise when such dilemmas 
involve one’s own identity.  Just as other people are seen in terms of his construct system, 
so the person-scientist experiences and understands himself or herself in these terms.  
Kelly uses the term core constructs to refer to those constructs “which govern a person’s 
maintenance processes- that is, those by which he maintains his identity and existence” 
(1955, p. 482).  These core constructs serve as the means whereby the person-scientist 
can know and, in fact, be himself or herself as they provide the only self-representation 
available to him/her.  If we are to take this term seriously, inconsistencies or 
insufficiencies involving core constructs are particularly distressing as they threaten to 
lead the person-scientist face to face with, perhaps, the ultimate chaos, the dismantling of 
his or her very existence.  
Operationalizing and Measuring Identity Conflict with PCT 
One might succinctly express Kelly’s theory by saying that we each understand 
the world, including self, in terms of our own implicit theories.   It is not his intent merely 
to make general statements about the beliefs and behaviors of the average person, but 
rather to provide a method of glimpsing into the idiographic theories that drive the beliefs 
and behaviors of each person-scientist.  In order to ascertain the specifics of these 
individual models, Kelly developed the repertory grid method, originally conceived of as 
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a card-sorting task (see Kelly’s triadic method of grid elicitation, 1955), in which various 
individuals considered to play roles central to the development of a person’s own identity 
are positioned in terms of the person’s own salient constructs.  Figure 1 is an example of 
an elicited repertory grid.  As can be seen, along the construct of happy-go-lucky v. 
worried all the time (a scale ranging from -2 to 2), this person rated her ‘self’ as very 
happy-go-lucky (-2), and her ‘ideal self’ as neither happy-go-lucky nor worried all the 
time (as indicated by the selection of 0, the scale midpoint). 
This process provides a sort of map of each person’s psychological space,- how 
the person views himself or herself in relation to others.  When the ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’ 
are used as grid elements, it is possible to identify congruent and discrepant constructs, as 
well as various relationships between such constructs.  Congruent constructs are said to 
occur when the ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’ are placed on the same pole of a bipolar construct 
(the desired pole); for example, if Stanley construes both his ‘actual self’ and his ‘ideal 
self’ as smart rather than stupid, he is said to be congruent along the construct smart v. 
stupid.  Conversely, a discrepant construct is said to occur when the ‘self’ is placed on 
one pole (the undesired pole), and the ‘ideal’ self on another (the desired state).  If 
Stanley construes his ‘actual self’ as unproductive and his ‘ideal self’ as productive, he is 
said to be discrepant along the construct productive v. unproductive. 
 Self-discrepancy.  Several researchers have attempted, using a Personal Construct 
approach, to operationalize and measure internal conflicts and their relationship with 
various measures of psychological well-being.  One type of internal conflict is simply a 
perceived discrepancy between one’s ‘self’ and one’s ‘ideal self.’  Generally, within 
dichotomous constructs, especially those concerning human behavior and character, one 
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pole emerges as desirable and the other as undesirable or less desirable (Kelly, 1955).  A 
repertory grid task may reveal that a person perceives a discrepancy between ‘self’ and 
‘ideal self.’  This self-ideal self dissonance conceivably contributes to negative emotions.   
 Fransella and Crisp (1979) suggested a measure of self-conflict in which conflict 
is operationalized as the angular distance between a desired-self state (self-construct) and 
self-element in a subject’s grid, and found increased self-conflict to be correlated with 
psychological disorder.  Winter (1983) found that self-conflict, as defined above, was 
related to guilt among neurotic subjects, and that its absence was related to increased 
perceptions of the subjects’ own psychological disorder as similar to a medical illness.  
He found no decrease in self-conflict over the course of therapy, and did not look at 
conflict in a normal population.  It is important to consider the possible role self-conflict 
plays in psychological well-being, especially in the light of Winter’s findings that neither 
group nor behavior therapy resulted in its decrease.  That is to say, if self-conflict is 
linked to negative psychological experiences, and therapy purports to address and 
alleviate negative psychological states, then it stands to reason that effective therapy 
would result in the reduction of self-conflict.  What, then, does this say about the role of 
self-discrepancy?   After all, if the person-scientist is the constructor of his or her own 
values, why does he or she not construe ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’ as one and the same?  
Perhaps there is some force, stronger that the desire for a positive self-view, that helps to 
maintain the discrepancy.  Hinkle (1965) argues that people will choose to see themselves 
in terms of the poles of constructs which they anticipate will, for them, be most likely to 
extend the implications of their construct systems.  That is to say, in spite of seeing the 
opposite pole as more desirable, a person will place himself or herself on the less 
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desirable pole of a single or multiple constructs if the undesired pole is associated with 
more positive constructs which the person sees as attainable.  It is often said that the 
largest part of intelligence is recognizing those things at which one excels and pursuing 
them.  So, although Stanley might, for example, prefer to be an athlete rather than a 
scholar, if he sees those terms as polar opposites, a realistic look at his abilities might 
deter him from pursuing sports over academia.  After all, Hinkle is saying, more self-
elaboration (and thus an expanded and more meaningful world) is available to him as a 
decent scholar than as a poor athlete.  If this is true, it is not simply self-discrepancy, but 
the relationship of various discrepant constructs to congruent constructs that causes 
internal conflict.  Referring to this conflicting hierarchical relationship between 
discrepant and congruent constructs, Hinkle coined the term ‘implicative dilemma.’         
Imbalanced Triads.  Slade and Sheehan (1979) suggest a method for measuring 
dilemmatic relationships between constructs by identifying what they call imbalanced 
triads.  This method, similar to Heider’s (1946) cognitive balance theory, is based upon 
Lauterbach’s (1975) technique for assessing conflict between three concepts.  Slade and 
Sheehan developed a computer program (CONFLICT), in which imbalance between 
constructs is said to occur when the correlations between two of the three pairs of 
constructs are positive and the remaining correlation is negative, or when all three 
correlations are negative.  The intensity of the conflictual relationship can also be 
measured using CONFLICT by converting the correlations to z-scores.  Slade and 
Sheehan concluded that most dilemmas are not to be associated with pathology, as 
situatedness beneath balanced higher-level constructs often renders them mere 
inconsistencies with little, if any, negative consequences.  In fact, they suggest that the 
 14
absence of conflicts might signal that a person is unable to cope with ambivalence and 
ambiguity, and thus pretend that no such case exists.  This is consistent with the results of 
an early study by Sheehan (1977), in which the construct systems of depressed 
individuals revealed less conflict than those of non-depressed individuals, as well as with 
Margolius (1980) who found low levels of conflict to be correlated with high scores on a 
measure of neurotic symptology.   
 A 1983 study by Winter, using the same method of dilemma identification, 
yielded results that might have further supported these findings; however, he noted 
reliability problems with the CONFLICT software developed by Slade and Sheehan 
(1979), in that it is insensitive to imbalance within construct systems where construct 
correlations are generally high, as is typical in the neurotic patient.  
Recent Studies of Implicative Dilemmas.  Recently, Feixas, Saúl and Sanchez 
(2000) have developed a method of identifying implicative dilemmas that promises to be 
more reliable than past attempts by incorporating the correlation between the poles of 
different constructs. In this way, dilemmas are identified using what is, in effect, a 
measure of the reliability with which a person believes that a pole of one construct 
predicts a pole of another construct.  Specifically, implicative dilemmas are determined in 
a three-step process. First, self-discrepant constructs are identified as those constructs on 
which the actual and ideal selves are rated at opposite ends of a bipolar scale. Second, the 
construct correlations are computed from all of the element ratings, and those constructs 
that correlate with the self-discrepant constructs according to a predetermined salience 
criteria (usually absolute r = .20 or absolute r = .35) are identified. Lastly, the saliently 
correlated constructs are examined for the location of the actual and ideal selves. For a 
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positively correlated construct, if the actual and ideal selves are both located at opposite 
ends of the rating scale compared to the ideal self on a given self-discrepant construct, 
then a dilemma is determined to be present. For a negatively correlated construct a 
dilemma is identified if the actual and ideal selves are located congruently with the ideal 
self on the given discrepant construct. 
As an example, suppose a man evaluating his performance as a father rated his 
actual self ‘1’ and his ideal self ‘5’ on the following scale: 
Weak disciplinarian  1     2     3     4     5   Firm disciplinarian 
 
Further, suppose the man rated his actual self ‘5’ and his ideal self ‘4’ on the following 
scale: 
 
“Draconian”/Heavy-handed  1     2     3     4     5   Offering guidance 
 
Finally, the man’s ratings of all the elements in the repertory grid yield a negative 
correlation (r = -.60) between the weak disciplinarian v. firm disciplinarian and 
Draconian v. offering guidance constructs; in other words, he tended to construe firm 
disciplinarians as Draconian. Following the three-step process above, the man is clearly 
self-discrepant on the weak in delivering discipline v. firm in delivering discipline 
construct. Secondly, the correlation of -.60 between the two constructs exceeds the 
salience criterion (absolute .35 for research studies). Lastly, the man’s ratings for the 
actual and ideal selves on the Draconian v. offering guidance construct are incongruent 
with his ideal self on the weak disciplinarian v. firm disciplinarian construct. In 
conclusion, he construes himself as a weak disciplinarian and desires to be a firm 
disciplinarian.  Blocked, however, from casting himself in the role of his ideal self in this 
respect due to a cost he considers too high (namely, becoming a dictator-like parent), he 
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is consequently stuck in an unsatisfied state of self-discrepancy in which he is unable to 
construe himself as the kind of parent he wants to be (Figure 2).  Using a Pearson’s 
product moment correlation (salience criterion) of .20 for clinical studies and .35 for 
research studies, Feixas and Saúl (2004) found that implicative dilemmas were present in 
a significantly larger proportion of those currently seeking therapy, as well as a 
significantly greater percentage of dilemmas per individual.  Their multi-center study 
included a sub-group of subjects with both social phobia and irritable bowel syndrome 
(IBS).  In contrast to the previously mentioned studies, they found dilemmas to be 
relevant to health related symptoms, and the resolution of dilemmas to be accompanied 
with a clinically significant decrease in both health-related as well as psychological 
symptoms. 
Dorough, Grice and Parker (2007) found modest significant correlations between 
percentages of implicative dilemmas as computed from a completed repertory grid, and 
depression, self-esteem and anxiety using a .20 salience criterion, and a significant 
correlation between percent of implicative dilemmas and anxiety using a .35 salience 
criterion.  The study also found evidence that implicative dilemmas account for a 
statistically significant, if modest, amount of variance in anxiety above and beyond the 
variance accounted for by actual/ideal self-discrepancies alone. 
Though the Dorough, Grice and Parker (2007) study, in part, provides evidence in 
support of the theory that implicative dilemmas are associated with negative 
psychological well-being, the effect sizes were modest, at best.  Additionally, the 
measures used to assess anxiety, depression and self-esteem failed to reflect these 
concepts in a distinctly Kellian way.  One intent of the current studies is to attempt to 
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replicate these findings using, among various other measures, the Personal Construct 
Inventory (Watson, Winter & Rossotti, 1997) which provides measures of psychological 
well-being that are more consistent with Personal Construct Theory. 
Proposed Subtypes of Implicative Dilemmas 
Several individual cases in the Dorough et al. (2007) study also raised questions 
regarding possible functions of and subtypes of implicative dilemmas.  That is to say, 
despite the overall positive correlation between high numbers of dilemmas and high 
anxiety, cases were noted in which high numbers of implicative dilemmas were not 
associated with anxiety, and yet the content of the dilemmas provided an intuitively 
logical explanation for the departure from the aggregate without bringing into question 
the theoretical basis of the overall positive correlation between dilemmas and anxiety.  
For instance, the grid of a 19-year old male revealed several implicative dilemmas, and 
yet he reported no anxiety.  He reported several self-discrepancies in which he admitted 
that he construes his ideal self as kind and caring but construes his actual self as rude and 
uncompassionate.  Notably, each of this young man’s self-discrepancies was seemingly 
maintained by the threat of feeling bad.  It is as if his dilemmas served a protective 
function, whereby he restrained himself from engaging pro-social behavior he valued 
because he wanted to remain disaffected by the plight of others.  This case suggests that 
there may be specific and consistent instances in which implicative dilemmas are 
negatively correlated with anxiety and other negative feelings.  Keeping this in mind, it is 
important to note that while studies have yielded significant correlations between anxiety 
and implicative dilemmas as defined by Feixas, Saul and Sanchez (2000), the correlations 
have been neither large nor consistent.  This is, perhaps, due to an oversight of subtypes 
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or variations of implicative dilemmas that have been subject to a single expectation.  If 
these subtypes are identified and isolated, the correlations between these various subtypes 
and dimensions of psychological well-being may be stronger and more consistent.   
Towards this end, we propose three subtypes of implicative dilemmas- the classic 
implicative dilemma, the ought-self dilemma, and the unobtainable-self dilemma, all of 
which are expected to predict different psychological experiences.    
Theoretically, the presence of dilemma subtypes is able to accommodate both the 
findings of Feixas and Saúl (2002) and Dorough et al. (2007), which suggest that 
implicative dilemmas are associated with negative psychological well-being, and the 
view held by early studies (Sheehan, 1977; Slade and Sheehan, 1979; Margolius, 1980; 
Winter, 1983) that dilemmas may also be a normal, and non-distressing part of the 
maintenance and evolution of one’s construct system, namely the subsystem of one’s 
core constructs.  In order to begin a meaningful discussion of the structure and possible 
implications of dilemma subtypes, a discussion of Kellian concepts of anxiety, guilt, 
depression and self-esteem is first necessary.   
For Kelly (1955), anxiety is the emotional manifestation of the realization of the 
insufficiency of one’s construct system to anticipate the outcome of an event.  It may be 
that the situation at hand simply falls outside of the range of convenience of most of a 
person construct system or that the situation in which the person finds himself or herself 
defies current constructs.  A woman who has been married to a man whose actions she 
can easily predict may, for example, experience Kellian anxiety when he begins to act in 
ways that she is unable to predict based upon her past observances of him.  Note that 
anxiety so conceived does not conform to popular notions of anxiety wherein it is 
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characterized by physical symptoms and feelings of impending doom.  For Kelly, anxiety 
is not knowing what is going to happen in some domain in which either previously 
developed laws, or hierarchical relationships between existing constructs, are no longer 
reliable or domains for which laws have not yet been developed.  Discomfort directly 
resulting from anxiety, then, is rooted in a fear of the unknown or unknowable. 
 Guilt, for Kelly, is the awareness that one’s ‘self’ is dislodged from one’s core 
role structures (1955, p. 565.)  This is not the same as self-discrepancy as defined above.  
Rather, it is the realization, similar to Roger’s (1959) incongruence, that one is not acting 
like the ‘self’ he or she has previously construed.  Though largely absent as a measure in 
the extant literature on implicative dilemmas, guilt is considered relevant to a discussion 
of implicative dilemmas, as dilemmas, and thus self-discrepancies may be sustained due 
to the threat of the guilt (and consequent loss of identity) that may accompany a move 
towards one’s ‘ideal self’ along certain constructs.  Guilt is not to be confused with 
diminished self-esteem, however, as guilt denotes for Kelly dislodgement only from core 
role constructs, and not as the perception of the self from desired constructs.  Self-esteem 
and guilt may, in fact, be related in such a way that an attempt to eliminate one may 
exacerbate the other.  In Personal Construct Theory, self-esteem has been operationalized 
in several ways, including the Euclidean distance between ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’ in a 
repertory grid, the number of discrepant constructs within a repertory grid (Dorough et 
al., 2007), and the proportion of positivity attributed to one’s ‘self’ across all constructs 
in a repertory grid (see Sewell’s Self-Esteem Index; Sewell, Cromwell, Adams-Webber 
and Mitterer, 1991).  The current study uses a grid-based measure of self-esteem 
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recommended by MacKay (1992) previously utilized by Grice, Burkley, Burkley, Wright 
and Slaby (2004), which is functionally equivalent to Sewell’s Self-Esteem Index. 
At times, the world can appear unmanageable and/or frighteningly beyond the 
scope of one’s ability to anticipate events.  In order to combat the feeling of helplessness 
to anticipate events (i.e., anxiety), Kelly suggests that some people will, via constriction, 
restrict the parts of the world they construe, thus creating a more manageable world.  
This, for Kelly (1995), is depression.  If it is true that the person-scientist only sees what 
can be defined in terms of his or her construct system, it makes sense that pruning back 
his or her construct system effectively eliminates the existence, for him/her, of those parts 
of the world which lie outside the range of convenience of his or her remaining 
constructs.  In a sense, Kellian depression is the constructive equivalent of a child 
covering her ears when she does not want to hear what is being said. 
The classic implicative dilemma.  In an effort to take into account for the nuances 
of dilemmas, implicative dilemmas as outlined by Feixas, Saul and Sanchez (2000) are to 
be considered only a subtype of implicative dilemmas that will be referred to as the 
classic implicative dilemma.  As previously outlined (see Figure 2), the classic 
implicative dilemma occurs when the desired pole of a discrepant construct regularly 
predicts the undesired pole of a congruent construct.  Classic implicative dilemmas 
involve awareness of discrepancies between the self and ideal self, as well as an implicit 
cost associated with becoming more like the ideal self.  A notable distinction of the 
classic implicative dilemma is that the self-discrepancy must be considered resolvable by 
the subject.  In other words, inherent within the idea of the classic implicative dilemma is 
the perception of an obtainable ideal-self.  If a person sees both a need and the potential 
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for a change, and is barred from making that change because it is incompatible with a 
valued congruent self-construct, he or she might be locked into a state of self-discrepancy 
indefinitely.  As this discrepancy will not be resolved, the classic implicative dilemma 
may be correlated with chronic depression and/or trait anxiety. 
The ought-self dilemma.  The second subtype of dilemma we propose will be 
referred to as the ought-self dilemma.  In this instance, rather than comparing his ideal 
self to his actual self, a person sees a discrepancy between his or her actual self, and 
someone who would be able to navigate his or her current situation more competently, 
which we will refer to as the “ought self.”  As the ought-self dilemma does not hinge 
upon an actual/ideal-self self-discrepancy, it is not expected to cause prolonged anxiety, 
but rather anxiety within the context during which the person feels socially unprepared, 
or incompetent.   
Consider the following example: A person applies for a job, for which she is well-
qualified, and receives an interview.  Though she sees herself as no-nonsense person, 
during the course of the interview, she begins to feel as if the interviewer is interested, 
not in her skills relevant to the job, but in her ability to carry on witty small-talk, or to 
“schmooze.”  Though she is acutely aware that a person more well-versed and competent 
in schmoozing would fare considerable better than will a no-nonsense, person, she is 
unable to assume that role.  Though, overall, she might be satisfied with her self as no-
nonsense, during the social situation of the job interview, she may experience acute 
anxiety as she cannot be the ‘ought self,’ the person who would excel in the situation, due 
either to a lack of imagination or to a lack of practice (Figure 3).   
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According to Kelly (1955), during a period of anxiety a person is likely to exhibit 
signs of constriction.  Therefore, though the self role to which she is accustomed is 
unsuited to social expectations and demands, she will likely cling to it, at least, until 
changing her ‘self’ role is no longer threatening.  Though she might later experiment with 
alternate, unfamiliar selves, this is unlikely to occur during times of anxiety.  Because the 
subject caught in an ought-self dilemma is not able or willing to envision herself in a role 
more suited to the task/situation at hand, the more competent/fitting role cannot be 
equated with an ‘ideal self.’  
This dilemma is, perhaps, more in line with Kelly’s description of the experience 
of anxiety than is the chronic anxiety that might be expected to accompany a classic 
implicative dilemma.  Kelly describes anxiety as a breakdown in the anticipatory powers 
of one’s construct system.  It is safe to say that we can never be completely without a 
construct system.  The breakdown of the construct system, therefore, may be assumed to 
be localized.  In other words, we experience anxiety due to the insufficiency of or a 
challenge to a specific portion of our construction system, likely an area that is currently 
salient and of some immediate importance.  Pursuing this line of thought, if one 
experiences a breakdown in his or her construct system that explains some part of the 
world/life that is not central to his or her identity, or to use a colloquialism, one that 
‘doesn’t hit close to home,’ he or she is more likely to experience a situation as absurd or 
irrelevant rather anxiety-provoking.  It may be important to note that implicit within the 
ought-self dilemma is the potential cost of guilt, which Kelly (1955) defines as the result 
of acting in a way that is not in line with one’s core role constructs, or beliefs about 
oneself.  Though a person caught in an ought-self dilemma is experiencing anxiety, the 
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dilemma may not be resolved, but may rather be sustained by the pressures of 
constriction and threat of guilt. 
The unobtainable-ideal-self dilemma.  An unobtainable-ideal-self dilemma, like a 
classic implicative dilemma, is said to exist when the desired pole of a discrepant 
construct serves as a significant predictor for the undesired pole of a congruent construct.  
These two subtypes differ, however, according to perceived attainability of the ‘ideal 
self.’  That is to say, in an unobtainable-ideal-self dilemma, the desired end of the 
discrepant construct is seen as unreachable by the subject; the self-discrepancy gap 
cannot be closed due to real or imagined limitations (e.g., limited intellectual or physical 
ability). 
In contrast to classic implicative dilemmas or ought-self dilemmas, in an 
unobtainable-ideal-self dilemma the association between the desired pole of the 
discrepant construct and the undesired pole of the congruent construct are likely to serve 
as consolation for an otherwise upsetting or even unbearable self-discrepancy.   
Consider, for example, a woman who construes her ‘self’ as obese, and her ‘ideal 
self’ as skinny.  Within her construct system, skinny is highly predictive of vain as 
opposed to accepting of one’s self.  If she perceives herself as unable to change her ‘self’ 
from obese to skinny, the negative implications of skinny might serve to alleviate (or at 
least mask) the negative effects of her self-discrepancy (Figure 4). 
In his Outline of a Theory of Emotion, Sartre (1948) touches upon this “sour 
grapes” phenomenon, describing emotion as an act whereby we can transform our 
situation.  If a person is confronted with an object or a situation that is, for him/her, 
charged with negative affective energy, he or she will react to the situation by 
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unreflectively assuming an emotional stance towards the object or situation which 
completely alters his or her situation, at times, “discharging the strong affective charge 
from objects…reducing them all to affective zero” (p. 65.)  Finding himself or herself 
lacking the power to deal with a situation, he or she simply employs, albeit often 
unreflectively, an emotion to alter the requirements the situation makes. So then, when a 
situation demands some superior behavior that one cannot maintain, one instead 
maintains an emotion, which is an inferior behavior, but requires less psychic energy to 
maintain.     
  Comparably, one who is caught in a painful self-discrepancy that cannot 
foreseeably be resolved, he or she may, via the construction and/or maintenance of a 
dilemma, effectively negate or, at least, diminish the pain by assuming a stance whereby 
the desired self-state becomes arguably distasteful.  Because of the possible consolatory 
properties of the unobtainable-ideal-self dilemma, this dilemma subtype may not be 
correlated with negative psychological experiences. 
Current Studies 
Two studies are proposed towards elaborating our understanding of the 
relationship between implicative dilemmas and psychological well-being.  In the first 
study, which is a replication of Dorough, Grice and Parker (2007) with one large 
modification, participants will complete a repertory grid using a sentence-completion 
method of elicitation designed to reveal self-discrepancies, if they exist, in several areas 
felt to be salient for young adults (i.e., body image, social competency).  The sentence-
completion method (see Grice, Burkley, Burkley, Wright & Slaby, 2004), in which 
participants provide salient constructs in answer to a series of incomplete sentences, 
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provides several advantages, the first being that it accommodates the human tendency 
towards a narrative understanding of self and world (see McAdam’s imagoes, 
1990;1993).  The human self as narrative is a concept that has been taken up by many in 
the field of Personal Construct Theory (PCT).  Where the triadic method is cumbersome, 
the sentence-completion method is less confusing, and easier to employ both for subject 
and researcher (Grice, Burkley, Burkley, et al., 2004).  Another advantage of this method 
is that sentences can be tailored to address identity within specific domains.  This is 
important as certain logical inconsistencies will be noticeable only during occasions in 
which the constructs relevant to the inconsistency are salient. 
Participants will then complete measures designed to assess anxiety and guilt 
from a Kellian perspective, and their grids will be analyzed to obtain a measure of self-
esteem.  It is expected that anxiety, guilt, depression and self-esteem will correlate 
significantly with the proportion of classic implicative dilemmas.  Percent of classic 
implicative dilemmas will also be correlated with measures of guilt, anxiety, self-esteem 
and depression obtained using the Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) technique developed by 
Grice and Jackson (2007).  Though Kelly discusses possible manifestations of depression 
(e.g. weeping, constriction, etc.), he does not clearly define depression as he does the 
other psychological experiences in question.  As no suitable grid-based measure of 
depression was found within PCT literature, a traditional measure of depression, the 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression will be administered (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) in hopes that this study will provide evidence for the validity of the DAS as an 
instrument for assessing Kellian depression in further studies.   
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The grids will be analyzed for classic implicative dilemmas and unobtainable-
ideal-self dilemmas.  By removing unobtainable-ideal-self dilemmas from the analyses, it 
is expected that zero-order correlations between number of dilemmas (using both the r = 
.20 and the r = .35 criterion) and Kellian measures of psychological well-being (self-
esteem, depression, anxiety and guilt) will be significant. Based upon previous results, it 
is also expected that anxiety will show the strongest relationship to dilemmas, and that 
the number of dilemmas will account for a significant amount of variance in anxiety 
beyond that accounted for by the number of discrepant constructs alone.  Essentially, this 
study is an attempt to strengthen effects found in the original study by a) removing the 
“noise” in the data caused by unobtainable-ideal-self dilemmas and by b) replacing non-
Kellian measures of psychological well-being with measures more suited to a Personal 
Construct Theory approach.     
The second study focuses on the relationship of ought-self dilemmas and anxiety.  
In this study, participants will be asked to provide a narrative recounting an event in 
which they experienced Kellian anxiety as well as a narrative of an event in which they 
felt fully competent.  They will then complete grids designed to elicit portions of their 
construct system that are relevant to each event.  It is expected that grids elicited in 
response to events marked by anxiety will contain significantly more ought-self 
dilemmas than grids elicited in response to events marked by feelings of competency.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Study 1 
Participants 
 
One-hundred and forty-seven people participated in this study. All of the 
participants were undergraduate students at Oklahoma State University, and earned 
course credit in exchange for their participation. Fifty-two of the participants were male, 
91 were female, and 4 declined to indicate gender. The majority of the participants (81%) 
reported their ethnicity as Caucasian, 5.4% as Native American, 2 % as Hispanic, 4.1% 
as African American, 6.1% as Asian, and .7% as “Other.” Age ranged from 18 to 30, with 
the majority of students between the ages of 18 and 20 (M = 19.19, SD = 1.72). The 
degrees of freedom reported below varied slightly due to missing data on the measures. 
Materials 
 
Idiogrid Software (Version 2.4).  Idiogrid (Grice, 2007) can be used to administer 
and analyze various types of self-report data.  Though designed specifically around 
George Kelly’s repertory grid technique, it allows the user to administer a variety of 
repertory grids, including triadic, dyadic, or monadic construct elicitation using either 
rating or ranking scales.  For this study, grids are created in three phases:  The first set of 
instructions directed participants to provide the names of 16 people who fit eight positive
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role titles and eight negative role titles.  In the second phase, 14 incomplete sentences 
were used to elicit the bipolar constructs.  One advantage of the use of the sentence-
completion method is that repertory grid tasks can be tailored to reveal constructs 
relevant to specific domains.  In this case, the sentence-completion task was designed to 
elicit constructs and elements (e.g., constructs relevant to body image, social competence, 
etc.) likely to reveal self-discrepancies along core constructs among the sample, which 
will be comprised mainly of college students.  Previous research using this sentence-
completion task yielded a mean of (2.38) actual-ideal-self discrepancies per 16 X 18 grid 
(constructs X elements; Dorough, Grice & Parker, 2007).  In the third phase participants 
rated their actual and ideal selves and the 16 named people (18 total elements) on 7-point 
scales anchored by their personal constructs. For each rating they were given the 
opportunity to choose a ‘does not apply’ option which was recorded as missing data.  The 
role titles and 14 incomplete sentences are included in Appendices A and B.  Previous 
research using Idiogrid has yielded data shown to be internally consistent and reliable 
over time, and self-ratings using Idiogrid have been shown to correlate highly with other 
multidimensional measures of self-concept (Grice, et al., 2004). 
Personal Construct Inventory.  The Personal Construct Inventory (PCI)  
is a self-report instrument designed to tap into six Kellian constructs: Threat, hostility, 
preemption, guilt, anxiety, and looseness.  The present study focused on a 7-item anxiety 
subscale (e.g., I feel like my foundations are shifting), and an 8-item guilt subscale (e.g., 
Lately, I have not been acting in the ways I know I should).  The original 80 item 
questionnaire (Chambers & O’Day, 1984) has been adapted by Watkins, Winter and 
Rossotti (1997) to increase both reliability and construct validity. Though several 
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subscales proved problematic even after significant amendments, high alphas were 
obtained for the anxiety (.92) and guilt subscales (.80).  The endorsement ratings of two 
expert raters yielded a significant agreement (.79) with items used to assess anxiety as a 
failure in the anticipatory power of one’s construct system.  The guilt subscale did not 
fare as well with the expert raters, and will thus be addressed more cautiously during data 
interpretation.  Past studies suggest both concurrent and predictive validity of the scales 
as measures of psychological well-being. 
Participants were asked to indicate, by rating each item on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from “not at all” (scored 0) to “extremely” (scored 4) the extent to which 
each statement described them during the last week (see Appendix C).  Total scores 
ranging from 0 to 35 and 0 to 40 for anxiety and guilt, respectively, were computed.   
Self-Esteem Index:  Self-esteem was measured using a method suggested by 
MacKay (1992) in which all constructs were keyed in the same direction based upon 
some criterion.  As previously defined by Grice, Burkley, Burkley, Wright and Slaby 
(2002), all constructs in the current study were keyed relative to participants’ ratings of 
their ‘ideal self.’  That is to say, when the ‘ideal self’ was rated below the midpoint of the 
scale, ratings for all of the elements along that particular construct were reflected.  If the 
‘ideal self’ was placed above the midpoint of the scale, the original ratings were 
maintained.  An average rating (ranging from -3 to +3) was then computed in which high 
values indicate positive self-evaluations and negative values indicate negative self-
evaluations.  Grice et al. (2002) found this method of assessing self-evaluations to have 
highly consistent test-retest reliability in the domains of mathematics and athletics (r = 
.84 and .81, respectively).  They also found this grid-based measure of domain-specific 
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self-concept to have both high discriminant and convergent validity (r’s < .15 and r’s > 
.70, respectively) when compared to relevant subscales of Marsh’s Self Description 
Questionnaire (SDQ-III, 1989). 
Dynamic Analog Scale:  The Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) is a technique 
developed by Grice and Jackson (2007) for generating single-item measures for various 
personality traits.  It is comprised of extensive trait definitions written by the test 
constructor and a quasi-continuous analog scale ranging from -200 to +200 on which the 
test taker simultaneously rates himself or herself as well as other people.  The DAS, 
generated by Idiogrid (Grice, 2002) requires participants to ‘drag’ elements (including 
self-elements) onto a scale that is ‘anchored’ by the opposite poles of chosen constructs.  
In a study conducted by Grice and Jackson (2007), the DAS technique was used to reduce 
a multi-item Big Five Personality trait questionnaire to five single-item measures.  The 
data showed support for the DAS as a viable means for obtaining reliable and valid trait 
data.  Though used in the past to measure personality traits, the DAS was adapted for the 
current study to serve as an additional measure for Kellian guilt, anxiety, self-esteem and 
constriction v. dilation, which will serve as a measure for depression.  One benefit of the 
DAS technique is that, like Kelly’s repertory grid method, it allows participants to rate 
themselves along various constructs in the context of a known comparison group.  
Another benefit is that the trait definition, or construct definitions in this case, were 
constructed in such a way that all participants rated themselves along a more or less 
shared construct.  That is to say, rather than asking participants to rate their current or 
recent level of ‘anxiety,’ a word that is encumbered by many connotations, most of them 
distinctly un-Kellian, each participant was provided with a detailed description of both 
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poles of the construct.  For instance, the Kellian construct of ‘guilt’ was anchored by the 
following descriptions, each coded to avoid evoking popular sentiments of ‘guilt’: 
C:  Every person has a picture of who he or she is.  There are certain attributes and/or 
behaviors that you value as part of your identity. Consider a state of mind or feeling when 
you are behaving in ways that do not conform to those values, or when you feel that you 
are not “acting like yourself.”  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘C.’ 
For example, someone for whom organized religion is an important part of his identity 
may feel ‘C’ when he does not attend religious services.  Another person who sees 
herself as ‘loyal’ may feel ‘C’ after gossiping behind a friend’s back. 
 
D:  You may, at one point, have been asked to list important things about yourself. Often, 
attributes that we value about ourselves are reflected in the ways in which we describe 
ourselves to others.  Consider a feeling or state of mind that you are likely to experience 
when your behaviors are consistent with the way in which your view yourself.  Let’s refer 
to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘D.’  For example, a person who lists ‘studious’ 
as an important aspect of her personality is likely to feel ‘D’ at a time when she is 
performing very well in school.  Another person who sees himself as ‘kind’ may feel ‘D’ 
while performing an act of charity.  
 
The descriptions of each scale anchor can be found in Appendix D.  In the current study, 
the DAS task was completed by rating the elements (i.e., people) generated by the 
sentence-completion tasks, and ‘self’ and ‘ideal self.’  A screen capture of the DAS 
anxiety scale is shown in Figure 5.  
Center for Epidemiological Study Depression Scale.  The Center for 
Epidemiological Study Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) is a self-report 
instrument for measuring depressive symptomology in the general population.  The CES-
D consists of 20 items assessing both thoughts and affect experienced in the past week 
(see Appendix G).  Participants rate each item on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from “rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” to “most or all of the time (5-7 days)”.  
Scores were averaged with final scores ranging from 1 to 20.  The CES-D has been found 
to yield data with both high internal consistency and adequate test-retest reliability.  
Substantial evidence of construct validity has also been reported (Radloff, 1977). 
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Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) Form Y-1:  The STAI-S is a self-
report measure designed to assess patient state anxiety during the last two weeks. It is 
comprised of six statements depicting how the individual may have felt, for example, 'I 
felt at ease' (Speilberger, 1983). The respondent chooses an answer from four response 
categories ranging from 'not at all' to 'very much'. Scores are summed (with some reverse 
scoring of individual items) to give a range from six (not at all anxious) to 24 (very 
anxious). 
Procedure 
Participants completed the repertory grid task described above.  They then 
completed the PCI and the CES-D while the researcher entered the names they provided 
in response to the 11 role-titles into the DAS program.  The researcher instructed each 
participant to use the DAS program to place themselves and others they know along the 
constructs provided in Appendix E (i.e., anxiety, guilt, self-esteem, constriction v. 
dilation) prior to completion of the DAS task.  After all measures were completed, 
participants were asked to make the following rating in response to all discrepant 
constructs appearing in implicative dilemmas located in their completed repertory grid:  
You described your ‘self’ as _____________ and your ‘ideal self’ as __________.  Using the following 
scale, please indicate how difficult you believe it would be for your ‘self’ to become ______________. 
 
                               1                               2                                  3                        4 
                  Not at all difficult      Somewhat difficult       Very difficult       Impossible 
                         for me                         for me                      for me                  for me 
 
This rating served to identify unobtainable-ideal-self dilemmas, as implicative dilemmas 
in which the discrepant construct contained an unobtainable-ideal-self (i.e., a rating of 4 
on the above scale) were not used for analysis.  
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 Due to a clerical error, some of the participants did not complete the STAI.  For 
this reason, degrees of freedom for analyses including this measure differ from degrees of 
freedom for the remaining analyses.   
Study 2 
Participants 
Sixty-three people participated in this study.  Participants were recruited via in-
class announcements in day and night classes at two universities and via the Oklahoma 
State University subject pool.  Participants were recruited from undergraduate, graduate, 
and adult studies classes.  Initially, recruitment was limited to graduate and adult studies 
students, however participation was later opened to undergraduate students due to low 
rate of participation.  Non-traditional students were originally targeted for participation in 
order to avoid range restriction in age and psychological well-being variables.  Later 
inclusion of traditional students was based upon the expectation that this population could 
adequately provide accounts of the phenomena in question.  This change was approved 
by the Institutional Review Board of Oklahoma State University.  Participants recruited 
before this revision were entered into a drawing for two fifty-dollar gift cards as 
compensation; those recruited after the revision were given the opportunity to receive 
course credit or to be placed into the drawing in exchange for their participation.  The 
majority of the participants (80%) opted to receive course credit. 
Of sixty-three total participants, 47 were included in the final analysis.  Six 
participants did not complete the study, and ten participants were removed from analysis 
because the narratives they provided did not meet the requirement for inclusion (e.g., 
anxiety narratives were not judged by raters to fit the criteria listed below for Kellian 
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anxiety or a narrative was an inappropriate response to the prompt). Thirteen of the 
participants were male, 33 were female, and 1 declined to indicate gender. The majority 
of the participants (76.6%) reported their ethnicity as Caucasian, 8.5% as Native 
American, 8.5% as African American, and 4.3% as Asian. Age ranged from 18 to 54, 
with the majority of students between the ages of 18 and 20 (M = 22.87, SD = 8.27). 
Materials 
 Anxiety narrative prompt:  Participants were asked to provide a short narrative in 
response to the following prompt:   
Please, provide a narrative that describes an event in your life during which you 
felt like you were unable to handle what life was throwing at you.  Recall that a narrative 
has a setting, a beginning, middle, and end.  As you are writing, try to place yourself in 
this part of your life.  If you are stuck, consider the following questions: 
 
How long ago did this happen? 
 
What things led up to this event? 
 
What were your thoughts and feelings at the time? 
 
Who are the key characters in this personal narrative, and what role did they play in the 
event? 
 
When did this situation resolve itself, if at all? 
 
Is there any advice you might give a person in a similar situation? 
 
This prompt was designed to elicit narratives describing experiences of a distinctly 
Kellian concept of anxiety.  Written narratives were requested as participants were 
deemed more likely to consider word choice more carefully when writing than when 
speaking.   
Competency narrative prompt:  Participants were also asked to provide a narrative 
of a time when they felt competent in response to the following prompt: 
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Please, provide a narrative that describes an event in your life during which you 
felt particularly competent.  That is to say, tell about a time when you felt like you were 
“in your element.”  Recall that a narrative has a setting, a beginning, middle, and end.  As 
you are writing, try to place yourself in this part of your life.  If you are stuck, consider 
the following questions: 
 
How long ago did this happen? 
 
What things led up to this event? 
 
What were your thoughts and feelings at the time? 
 
Who are the key characters in this personal narrative, and what role did they play in the 
event? 
 
Did this event in any way change your evaluation of yourself? 
Idiogrid v. 2.4.  Participants completed two repertory grids, using a sentence-
completion task generated by Idiogrid v. 2.4, in which they were guided to create 
domain-specific grids relevant to both the anxiety and competency experience recounted 
in the narratives they provided.  As in the first study, the grid task was a sentence-
completion task consisting of three phases.  In the first phase, participants were asked to 
provide the names of 11 people considered pertinent to the recounted experience (e.g., 
‘Someone who would have navigated this situation more successfully than I did,’ ‘The 
person to whom I turned for advice during this time.’)  A complete list of role titles is 
included in Appendix E. In the second phase, 10 incomplete sentences were used to elicit 
bipolar constructs.  These sentences are designed to elicit constructs relevant to the 
anxiety experience and to the experience of competency (see Appendix F).  For example, 
participants were asked to complete the following sentence, “[Someone who would have 
navigated this situation more successfully than I did] would have been better able to 
handle the situation because he or she is _____________.”  They were then prompted for 
the opposing pole of the elicited construct.  In the third phase participants rated their 
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actual and ideal selves and the 11 named people (13 total elements) on 5-point scales 
anchored by their personal constructs. For each rating they were also given the 
opportunity to choose a ‘does not apply’ option which was recorded as missing data. The 
role titles and 10 incomplete sentences are included in Appendix C.  The role title 
‘Someone who would have navigated this situation more successfully than I did’ served 
as an ‘ought self’ when analyzing the grid for ought-self dilemmas.   This measure of the 
‘ought-self’ was employed as the ‘ought-self’ does not necessarily imply the ‘ideal self.’  
Where people are able to cast themselves, at least in their imagination, as their ‘ideal 
self,’ it may be difficult or even impossible for them to see themselves as others might 
desire them to be in certain situations.  As subjects may be unable or unlikely to consider 
this, the term ‘ought self’ may cause them to consider a caricature of themselves rather 
than a picture of themselves behaving in a way that is distinctly not themselves.  Thus, the 
above role title should capture the ‘ought self’ discrepancy intended by the researcher 
rather than conflating it with the ‘ideal self’ as well as with a conglomerate of various 
‘ought selves’ that are distinctly unlike the subject. 
 The narratives provided by the participants were designed to serve two purposes.  
The first was to ensure that participants are completing the anxiety grid with true Kellian 
anxiety in mind.  As the word anxiety is encumbered with many meanings far removed 
from Kelly’s conception of the term, it was deemed unacceptable to ask them to simply 
consider a time when they were anxious.  It was also hoped that the act of providing the 
narratives served to remind the participant of the recounted experience and allowed them 
to provide constructs and elements that were truly relevant to the events contained in the 
narratives.     
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Procedure  
 
Participants were recruited as described above, and were then contacted via e-
mail.  The repertory grid tasks were completed over the course of two sessions lasting no 
more than one hour each, and took place on the campus from which each participant was 
recruited.  Once an appointment time was set for the first session, participants were 
provided with the prompt for either the anxiety narrative or the competency narrative as 
the order in which the participants complete the narrative was counterbalanced.  
Participants were asked to write the first narrative prior to the first research session, and 
began the first session by re-reading the narrative prior to completing the repertory grid 
task.  This was done in order to allow participants to provide sufficiently rich data for 
further analysis, and to avoid fatigue during the actual sessions and in hopes that it would 
allow participants to reflect upon their past experiences.  During the first session, 
participants were asked to complete a repertory grid using the sentence-completion task 
above keeping in mind the event or situation they provided in response to the first 
prompt.  Upon completion of the first session, participants scheduled a second 
appointment, and received the second narrative prompt. 
On a separate occasion, 7 to 21 days after the first session, participants again 
brought a pre-written narrative to the second research session.  They were again asked to 
re-read the narrative, and to complete a second repertory grid using the sentence-
completion task outlined above, this time keeping in mind the event described in the 
narrative they provided in response to the second prompt.   
The narratives were not coded or scored, but the anxiety narratives were 
examined by two independent raters for the themes of anxiety accounted for by the PCI.  
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Narratives judged by one or both raters to lack a reference to at least one of the seven 
anxiety items (i.e., ‘I am lately more and more confused,’ ‘Life is confusing and chaotic 
to me,’ ‘People are generally confusing to me,’ ‘I feel like my foundations are shifting,’ 
‘I feel empty inside,’ ‘I am often very anxious and confused,’ ‘Quite often, I am not sure 
of who I am’) as a predominant theme were not included in analysis.  Grids associated 
with any narrative that was irrelevant or inappropriate to the prompt in response to which 
it was provided were also excluded from analysis.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Study 1   
 Both classic implicative dilemmas and unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas were 
computed from the repertory grid ratings following the algorithm described in the 
Introduction above.  Results indicated that dilemmas (combined number of classic 
implicative dilemmas and unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas) were present in 59.5% of the 
participants’ grids using the .20 salience criterion (M = 2.91, SD = 3.89) and 40.5% of the 
grids using the .35 criterion (M = 1.6, SD = 2.67).  These percentages are lower than the 
percentages of implicative dilemmas found by Dorough et al. (2007) using an identical 
elicitation task among a similar sample (73.5 for .20, 64.4 for .35), but an independent 
samples t-test did not reveal a significant difference in percentage of implicative 
dilemmas between the two samples.  As all analyses conducted were interested in the 
predictive value of only classic implicative dilemmas, percent of classic implicative 
dilemmas were calculated and found to be present in 39.5% of the participants’ grids 
using the .20 salience criterion, and in 29.2% of the grids using the .35 criterion. Analysis 
of the participants’ grid data yielded an average of 1.37% classic implicative dilemmas at 
the .20 level (SD = 2.50) and .79% at the .35 level (SD = 1.86).  
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As the DAS subscales were novel measures of Kellian psychological well-being, 
it is of note to consider the shared variance between each of these subscales and the other, 
more established measures of psychological well-being (see Table 2).  The DAS guilt 
score, as expected, was a significant positive predictor of PCI guilt scores, CES-D 
depression scores, and the PCI, STAI and DAS anxiety scores and a significant negative 
predictor of both grid-based and DAS self-esteem scores (p’s < .01).  The DAS anxiety 
score was a significant positive predictor of PCI and STAI anxiety scores, PCI and DAS 
guilt scores, CES-D depression scores and a significant negative predictor of both grid-
based and DAS self-esteem scores (p’s <.01).  Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) self-esteem 
score was a significant positive predictor of grid-based self-esteem scores, and a 
significant negative predictor of STAI, PCI and DAS anxiety scores, PCI and DAS guilt 
scores, and CES-D depression scores (p’s < .01).  The DAS constriction scale did not, 
however, perform as expected; DAS constriction scores failed to predict scores on any 
other measure of psychological well-being. 
Zero-order correlations were calculated for the discrete measures of anxiety, guilt, 
depression and self-esteem and percentage of classic implicative dilemmas at both the .20 
and.35 salience level (Feixas, Saúl and Sanchez, 2000).  Correlations were also calculated 
for percentage of classic implicative dilemmas and anxiety, guilt, depression and self-
esteem as measured by the DAS.  Unobtainable-ideal-self dilemmas (in which 
participants rated discrepant construct obtainability as “4 = Impossible for me” to change) 
were excluded from analysis.  In the results to follow, the term “implicative dilemmas” 
refers only to classic implicative dilemmas. 
 41
As shown in Table 1, consistent with expectations, the percentage of implicative 
dilemmas at the .20 level was significantly correlated with the grid-based measure of self-
esteem, guilt (as measured by the DAS), and anxiety (as measured by both the DAS and 
the PCI), and depression (as measured by the CES-D). Also as expected, greater 
percentages of  implicative dilemmas were associated with lower self-esteem and higher 
guilt and anxiety. At the .35 level, the percentage of implicative dilemmas was again 
significantly correlated with self-esteem, guilt and anxiety as measured by the DAS, but 
was not significantly correlated with the PCI anxiety subscale.  Due to a positively 
skewed distribution in CES-D scores, all correlations including this measure were 
computed using Spearman’s rho. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were also conducted to examine the 
unique contribution of implicative dilemmas in the grids to the prediction of depression, 
anxiety, guilt and self-esteem. A separate analysis was conducted for each of the 
psychological well-being measures, with the number of self-discrepant constructs in the 
grids entered as the predictor in the first step for each model. In the second step the 
percentage of dilemmas was entered. The hierarchical model for anxiety, for instance, 
was constructed as follows:  
Step 1: Anxiety = a + b1(Actual-Ideal Discrepancies) + ε 
Step 2: Anxiety = a + b1(Actual-Ideal Discrepancies) + b2(Percent Dilemmas) + ε  
These 2-step hierarchical regression analyses served to ascertain whether implicative 
dilemmas predicted psychological well-being above and beyond the number of 
discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves.   As in the previous analyses, all 
known unobtainable discrepancies and unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas were excluded. 
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The results of the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 show that, while self-discrepancies 
were predictive of low self-esteem, high anxiety (as measured by the STAI, PCI and 
DAS), high guilt at both salience criteria (.20 and .35), percent dilemmas were uniquely 
predictive of only self-esteem (grid-based measure), guilt and anxiety (as measured by 
the DAS) at the .20 level, and of only anxiety and self-esteem (grid-based measure) at the 
.35 level. Though significant, it is important to note that the magnitude of the latter 
effects were small, with percent dilemmas accounting for only 3.5% of the variance in 
guilt at the .20 salience level, 3.4% of the variance in anxiety at the .20 and .35 salience 
level, and 6.3% and 5.7% of the variance in self-esteem at the .20 and .35 salience levels, 
respectively.  Finally, it should be noted that examination of each regression model did 
not indicate the presence of outliers, multicollinearity, or violations of statistical 
assumptions. 
Though the effect size for the variance in the grid-based measure of self-esteem 
accounted for by percent dilemmas found in this data exceeds the effect size for the 
variance in self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem index (.6% at 
the .20 level) found by Dorough et al. (2007), the effect size for the variance on the DAS 
anxiety subscale is slightly lower than the 4.4% variance in anxiety reported by Dorough 
et al. in which anxiety was measured by the Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist (Derogatis, 
Lipman, Rickles, Uhlenhuth and Covi, 1974). 
Exploratory Analyses for Study 1 
 As indicated above, for all discrepant constructs appearing in implicative 
dilemmas, participants were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1-4 how difficult it would be 
for him or her to resolve the self-discrepancy (1 = Not at all difficult for me, 2 = 
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Somewhat difficult for me, 3 = Very difficult for me, 4 = Impossible for me.) Zero-order 
correlations were calculated for all measures of psychological well-being and number of 
self-discrepancies rated at each level of obtainability.  A pattern emerged among the 
Kellian measures of psychological well-being (excluding the DAS 
constriction/preemption scale) and ratings of obtainability.  Correlations between guilt (as 
measured by the DAS) and anxiety (as measured by the PCI and the DAS) and the grid-
based measure of self-esteem rose to significance in the expected directions as 
obtainability ratings approached 3 and dropped below significance when obtainability 
ratings reached 4 (see Table 4.) This pattern was also observed when zero-order 
correlations were obtained for Kellian measures of psychological well-being and the 
number of implicative dilemmas containing discrepant construct at each level of 
obtainability (viz., implicative dilemmas in which the discrepant construct was rated at 
exactly 1, 2, 3 or 4; see Table 5).  The DAS self-esteem subscale followed this pattern, as 
well, but the correlations did not reach significance.  The two non-Kellian measures of 
psychological well-being (the CES-D and the STAI) followed a different pattern in which 
correlations continued to increase as obtainability ratings approached 4.     
Study 2 
  Using Idiogrid, the grids were analyzed for ought-self dilemmas as described 
above. A t-test was conducted to ascertain whether the participants’ anxiety grids contain 
a significantly higher number of ought-self dilemmas than the competency grids.  It was 
expected that the anxiety-grids would reveal a significantly higher number of ‘ought-self 
dilemmas’ than the competency grids.   
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 Ought-self dilemmas were defined as constructs in which ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’ 
were placed on a single pole of a construct and the ‘ought-self’ was placed on the 
opposite pole.  In this study, the person named as “someone who would have navigated 
this situation better than you” served as the ‘ought self’ element.  Results indicated that 
ought self dilemmas were present in 14.9% of anxiety grids and 14.9% of competency 
grids.  Analysis of the participants’ grids yielded a mean of .17 dilemmas per grid (SD = 
.433). 
 Contrary to expectations, a paired samples t-test revealed that the mean number of 
ought-self dilemmas contained in the anxiety grids (M = .17, SD =.433) did not differ 
from the mean number of ought-self dilemmas contained in the competency grids (M = 
.17, SD = .433; t (46) = .000, p > .05).  The 95% confidence interval indicates moderate 
precision in the estimated population mean difference (-.06 to .06).  
 When ought-self dilemmas were defined as personal constructs in which the ‘self’ 
was placed no more than two points away from the ‘ideal self’ and no less than three 
points away from the ‘ought self’ on a 5-point Likert type scale, dilemmas were found to 
be present in 46.8% of the anxiety grids (M = .64, SD = .55) and 34% of the competency 
grids (M = .55, SD = 1.21).  Using this criteria, a paired samples t-test again revealed no 
significant different in number of dilemmas, t (46) = .586, p = .56.  The 95% confidence 
interval indicates low precision in the estimated population mean difference (-.21 to 
.038). 
 45
CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Dorough, Grice and Parker (2007) conducted a study in which the percent of 
implicative dilemmas in participants’ repertory grids was found to be a weak predictor of 
low self-esteem, high depression and high anxiety.  Implicative dilemmas were also 
investigated as potential contributors to variation in self-esteem, depression and anxiety 
beyond that accounted for by self-discrepancies alone.  A series of hierarchical 
regressions revealed only a small effect (4.4%) of percent dilemmas at the .20 criteria for 
anxiety.  Implicative dilemmas were identified as previously defined by Feixas and Saúl 
(2004; see also Feixas, Saúl & Sanchez, 2000).  Self-esteem was measured using the 
Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Inventory (RSEI; Rosenberg, 1965), depression was measured 
using the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
and the depression subscale of the Hopkin’s Symptom Checklist (HSCL), and anxiety 
was measured using the anxiety subscale of the HSCL (Derogatis et al., 1974). 
 Study 1 was an attempt to improve the study conducted by Dorough et al. (2007) 
by a) utilizing measurements of psychological well-being that are distinctly Kellian in 
nature and b) removing from the analyses unobtainable self-discrepancies and 
unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas.  In the discussion that follows, the terms “implicative
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dilemma” and “dilemma” will refer to classic implicative dilemmas.  Unobtainable ideal-
self dilemmas will be referred to as unobtainable dilemmas. 
 Though the measures of psychological well-being used by Dorough et al. (2007) 
are widely used in the psychological literature and have well-established psychometric 
properties, they depart all but nominally from Kelly’s constructs of self-esteem, 
depression and anxiety.  For instance, symptoms on the anxiety subscale of the Hopkin’s 
Symptom Checklist such as ‘trembling’, ‘feeling fearful’, and ‘heart pounding or racing’, 
fail to reflect Kelly’s definition of anxiety as “the awareness that the events with which 
one is confronted lie mostly outside the range of convenience of his construct system” (p. 
565).  Study 1 utilized, instead, the anxiety and guilt subscales of the Revised Personal 
Construct Inventory (PCI) as adapted by Watkins, Winter and Rossotti (1984; 1997), a 
grid-based measure of self-esteem, and four single-item measures of constriction, 
anxiety, self-esteem and guilt.  Two conventional measures, Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Speilberger, 1983) and the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) were also 
administered.   
 Unobtainable self-discrepancies and unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas were 
excluded from analysis as it was theorized that, in the case of an implicative dilemma 
built upon a discrepant dilemma in which the desired pole is unobtainable, the ‘cost’ of 
the resolution of the self-discrepancy may serve as a consolation, thus negating the 
expected negative psychological effects of the discrepancy. 
 With these adjustments, it was expected that implicative dilemmas would predict 
low self-esteem, high depression and high anxiety to a greater degree than found by 
Dorough et al. (2007).  It was also expected that percent implicative dilemmas would 
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predict high guilt.  The present study failed to support these hypotheses.  Though 
significant correlations were found between percent implicative dilemmas and depression 
(as measured by the CES-D), anxiety (as measured by the PCI, the DAS, and the STAI), 
all of the effect sizes were smaller than those found by Dorough et al. (2007).  The 
squared correlation between percent dilemmas and the grid-based measure of self-esteem 
(10.5% at the .20 level and 7.8% at the .35 level) alone exceeded the effect size found by 
Dorough et al. (2007) for self-esteem as measured by the RSEI (4.5% at the .20 level and 
1.8 at the .35 level; Radloff, 1977).  None of the remaining variables shared a significant 
amount of variance with percent dilemmas. 
 Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to ascertain whether percent 
dilemmas accounted for variability in measured variables above and beyond that 
accounted for by self-discrepancies alone.  Separate analyses were conducted for each 
measure of psychological well-being with the expectation that effect sizes would exceed 
those found by Dorough et al. (2007).  At the .20 level, percent dilemmas accounted for 
3.4% of the variation in anxiety as measured by the single-item measure Dynamic Analog 
Scale (DAS) task.  Though significant, this failed to exceed the 4.4% of variance of 
anxiety as measured by the anxiety subscale of the HSCL (Derogatis et al., 1974) 
reported by Dorough et al. (2007).  In the current study, however, percent dilemmas at 
the .35 level did significantly account for 3.4% of anxiety as measured by the DAS while 
Dorough et al. failed to report a significant effect for anxiety at the .35 level.  Percent 
implicative dilemmas also accounted for a significant amount of variance in guilt (3.5% 
at the .20 level) as measured by the DAS and in the grid-based measure of self-esteem 
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(6.3% at the .20 level and 5.7% at the .35 level) beyond variance accounted for by self-
discrepancies alone. 
 Though bivariate correlations suggest that the DAS subscales for guilt, anxiety 
and self-esteem are valid measures of psychological well-being, it should also be noted 
that the constriction/preemption DAS scale, intended as a Kellian measure of depression, 
seems to have missed the mark.  Constriction was expected to be a significant positive 
predictor of depression, guilt and anxiety and a significant negative predictor of self-
esteem.  The failure of the data to confirm these expectations prompted a closer look at 
the content validity of the DAS constriction scale.   Kelly (1955) defined constriction in 
terms of the process of reducing one’s perceptual field, thereby limiting that which is 
subject to construal. Preemption, however, is said to involve a reduction in the number of 
type of constructs one utilizes such that elements one construes can be seen in only one 
way.  That is to say, constriction refers to a reduction in what we construe, or elements, 
while preemption refers to the reduction in the availability of categories into which 
elements may be placed, or constructs (Kelly, 1955).  The DAS preemption/constriction 
scale is, therefore, a misnomer.  As it stands, the DAS “constriction” scale should be 
treated as a preemption scale and future attempts to measure constriction using this 
method should be based upon anchors revised to reflect constriction accurately.  Where 
constriction has been associated with depression and anxiety, the association between 
psychological well-being and preemption is unclear.  
 Though some significant effects were found, most notably those associated with 
self-esteem, Study 1failed, overall, to improve upon the predictive value of percent 
implicative dilemmas as reported by Dorough et al. (2007).  Nonetheless, this study is 
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encouraging as we were able to corroborate the finding of Dorough et al. that implicative 
dilemmas account for a statistically significant portion of anxiety as measured by the 
DAS task, a novel measure of Kellian anxiety.  Additionally, the results of this study 
indicate that implicative dilemmas may also be related to heightened feelings of guilt, not 
measured by Dorough et al. and that implicative dilemmas are substantially more related 
to a grid-based index of self-esteem than to self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg’s 
well-regarded Self-Esteem Index (1965).   
Exploratory analyses also revealed an interesting pattern that lends support to the 
proposal that unobtainable discrepancies may serve an insulatory function against the 
negative psychological experience commonly associated with self-discrepancy. Zero-
order correlations were found for number of self-discrepancies rated exactly 1, 2, 3 or 4 
and psychological variables.  For all Kellian measures of psychological well-being 
(excluding the DAS constriction scale and the PCI guilt scale) correlations became 
stronger as the obtainability level approached 3 and dropped when the obtainability level 
reached 4 suggesting that self-discrepancies become more distressing as they become less 
obtainable, that distress peaks when becoming the ‘ideal self’ is very difficult, but not 
impossible, and that distress drops when attaining the desired ‘self’ state is deemed 
impossible.  This pattern was also observed when zero-order correlations were found 
between percent implicative dilemmas and Kellian measures.  The two non-Kellian 
measures of psychological well-being (the CES-D and the STAI) followed a different 
pattern in which correlations remained the same or continued to increase as obtainability 
ratings approached 4.  This different pattern among Kellian and non-Kellian measures of 
psychological well-being may be attributed to the fact that the items that constituted the 
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Kellian measures zeroed in on each participant’s anticipation of the future of his or her 
world, departures from personal values and/or that participant’s ability to move within his 
or her own personal construct system.  The non-Kellian measures, on the other hand, 
focused on general physical and emotional symptoms.  Thus, the Kellian measures may 
provide the better glimpse into the distress associated with the navigation and potential 
modification of one’s own meaning-making/value system.  
 The results of the exploratory analyses of Study 1 are encouraging as they offer 
some support to the concept of the unobtainable ideal-self dilemma, or at the very least, 
that self-discrepancies may become more distressing as they increase in difficulty, but 
become less distressing when they are deemed irresolvable.  Intuitively, this makes sense.  
If a person does not like the way he or she is in a certain domain, but feels that it will be 
easy to change to a desired state, he or she may remain in a state of self-discrepancy for 
an indefinite amount of time with little distress.  “After all,” he or she may say, “I can 
always change tomorrow.” 
 As a desired self state becomes more difficult to achieve, however, a person’s 
level of distress may rise.  Consider for example an amateur athlete who aspires to be in 
peak physical condition in hopes that she may one day enter the WNBA.  She may desire 
to change her behavior to achieve that goal, and while she has the knowledge that it is 
possible, that knowledge may be accompanied by the anticipation of the hard road that 
must be traveled if she is to make the desired change.  To attain her goal she must eat 
correctly, practice often to improve her skill, and work out daily to gain strength and 
stamina.  The knowledge or belief alone that she has the ability to implement this positive 
change may be the very thing that causes her distress.  The knowledge of the attainability 
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of her goal propels her towards change, while the difficulty of resolving the discrepancy 
(e.g., her ‘self’ is not in peak physical condition, whereas her ‘ideal self’ is in peak 
physical condition) may repel her away from change.  If this is true, then the knowledge 
or belief that a desired self state is unattainable may be seen as a relief.  In the case of the 
athlete, if she comes to the conclusion that her goal is no longer attainable, she may feel a 
relief as the hard work of achieving her goal is no longer necessary.  This may play a role 
in the procrastination of self-improvement goals.  Not only are we waiting because we 
fear hardship or failure, we may also be waiting for the sweet release we feel when a once 
attainable goal becomes a pipe dream. 
 Study 2 was designed to detect the proposed ‘ought-self dilemma.’  It was 
expected that, if ‘ought-self dilemmas’ are likely to appear in times of acute anxiety, that 
a repertory grid guided by a narrative of a personal experience of anxiety would contain a 
significantly higher number of ‘ought-self dilemmas’ than a repertory grid guided by a 
narrative of a personal experience of competency provided by the same person.  A paired 
samples t-test comparing anxiety grids and competency grids revealed no difference in 
the number of ‘ought-self dilemmas’ contained in the grids.  
 Two major weaknesses stand out in the design of the study that may have 
contributed to the null results.  First, while the narrative prompts and the first two phases 
of the sentence-elicitation task were worded to guide participants to provide only 
constructs and elements relevant to a specific event, the final phase, the rating task in 
which participants provided the numeric data that allows for the identification of 
dilemmas, was not worded in such at way that participants were prompted to rate 
elements as they would behave in the context of the situation described in the narrative.  
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For example, during the first phase participants were asked to provide that name of 
“someone who would have navigated this situation better than you.”  Suppose a 
participant provided that name ‘Mary.’  In the next phase, participants were asked to 
provide a relevant bipolar construct in response to the following sentence:  Mary would 
have handled this situation better than me because she is ___________, as opposed to 
____________.”  Suppose the participant responded with confident as opposed to unsure 
of herself.  In the final phase, the participants were asked to conduct ratings of all 
provided elements along all provided constructs.  The rating task for the example element 
along the example construct would have said simply:   
                           
     “Please, rate Mary along the following scale:”  
 
Confident  1     2     3     4     5   Unsure of herself 
 
 All ratings, including ‘self’ and ‘ideal self’, were conducted using the same 
format.  This presents a problem as Mary (and all of the other elements) may be confident 
in situation like the one described, but unsure of herself in general.  Additionally, Mary 
may be reasonably expected to act in one way during a situation of acute anxiety, but a 
different way during most situations.  As other constructs used in the rating task were not 
anchored by Mary, ratings of Mary along all other constructs are likely to reflect how 
Mary behaves in the majority of circumstances rather than the specific event in question.  
It cannot be determined, after the fact, whether participants rated the behavior/attributes 
of elements in general or within a specific situation.  As ‘ought-self dilemmas’ are 
thought to be short-lived and context-dependent, this error renders any ‘ought-self 
dilemmas’ that are identified, as well as the entire grid of each participant, 
uninterpretable. 
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 The second design error involves the anxiety narrative prompt.  Though the 
prompt clearly indicated that participants should describe a single event, many 
participants provided a description of multiple events.  Despite instructions, the phrase 
“unable to handle what life was throwing at you” seemed to have elicited feelings of 
stress and being overwhelmed.  Though the majority of the anxiety narratives were 
judged to be accounts of Kellian anxiety, the wording of the anxiety prompt may have 
confused some participants and affected the outcome of the study.  A better anxiety 
prompt may have been:  “Please describe a single event in your life when you felt like 
someone wanted you to be something that you are not.”  Though this may seem heavy-
handed, it may zero in on relevant ‘ought-self dilemmas’ that may otherwise be missed. 
 As is always a concern when eliciting repertory grids, it is possible that the role 
titles we used to elicit grid elements did not trigger participants to provide people relevant 
to the event in question.  A clinician who is able to become familiar with a client over 
time, in and through multiple interactions, is likely better able to guide the client to 
provide relevant elements than is a researcher preparing a generic sentence-completion 
task to be administered to many participants.  As researchers conducting laboratory 
studies based on the aggregate model, we are at a disadvantage when it comes to tailoring 
tasks to zero in on true and relevant cognitive dilemmas. 
 Taken together, the studies presented here do not provide strong evidence for 
implicative dilemmas as predictors of anxiety, depression, guilt or evidence for the 
presence of ‘ought-self dilemmas’ in situations of acute anxiety.  They do offer some 
encouragement that we are on the right track as we were able to replicate previous 
findings that implicative dilemmas do play some role in anxiety.  We also gained support 
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for expectations that implicative dilemmas are associated with guilt and found a 
significant increase in the effect size for the variability in self-esteem accounted for by 
implicative dilemmas beyond that accounted for self-discrepancies by using a grid-based 
measure of self-esteem (rooted in Kellian theory) rather than the RSEI (1965).   
These modest results, along with human experience and some encouraging data 
provided by exploratory analyses, suggest that these dynamic cognitive dilemmas do play 
a role in our ever-changing psychological states.  The efforts of personal construct 
theorists operating outside of clinical practice may be hampered by the shortcomings of 
the aggregate model.  Future studies will benefit from increased focus on the individual.  
This may be achieved by studying a smaller number of individuals longitudinally, by 
observing individuals during a period of transition or distress, or simply by giving more 
attention and respect to the individuals that make up the aggregate.  Though it may be 
accompanied at times by distress, intrapersonal conflict is both necessitator and tool of 
change, and thus it warrants our continued attention as researchers who are looking, not 
only for significant effect sizes, but also for significant insights into the ebb and flow of 
human transformation.  
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Appendix A 
Eight negative and eight positive role descriptions 
 
A former boyfriend/girlfriend whom you now dislike 
A person whom you consider to be unethical or immoral 
A person in high school or middle school whom you did not like 
The teacher or coach whom you did not like or who was a poor role model 
The most dishonest person you know personally 
A person whom you once thought was a friend but in whom you were badly disappointed. 
A person with whom you have worked and did not get along with 
A person in your family whom you consider to be a poor role model 
 
A current or past romantic partner whom you still love 
A person who upholds high ethical and moral standards (other than yourself) 
A person in high school or middle school whom you liked 
The teacher or coach whom you liked or thought was a good role model 
The most honest person you know personally (other than yourself) 
A current close friend (other than your romantic partner) 
A person with whom you have worked and got along with well 
A person in your family whom you consider to be a good role model 
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Appendix B 
Incomplete Sentences 
 
1.  It is common to want to change things about your physical appearance. For me, it would be 
nice if I were ______. 
2.   I am embarrassed when I act like I am ________. 
3.  Often people behave in ways they don’t particularly like. Sometimes I am disappointed to 
find myself acting like ________.  
4.  When I get emotional, I wish I wouldn’t __________. 
5.  It is normal to sometimes envy other people. The people I sometimes envy are typically 
________. 
6.  It is true that no one is perfect, and sometimes I really wish I wouldn’t ________. 
7.  Generally speaking, other people think that I ought to be more ____________. 
8. If I had to describe myself in one word, I would say that I am _________. 
9. One of the things I admire about $E9$ is that he or she is ________. 
10. In order to make mature decisions in life, a person really needs to _________. 
11. To qualify as a person I dislike, you must be the type of person who is _______________. 
12. The typical student at OSU is the type of person who enjoys  _________. 
13. Most people in America tend to _________. 
14. When I go to parties, I generally feel _________. 
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Appendix C 
Revised Personal Construct Inventory 
 
Directions:  Indicate the extent to which each you agree with each statement.  Please, indicate the 
extent of your agreement or disagreement by using the following scale: 
1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree or disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 =  Strongly disagree 
 
__1.  I expect that I will be a very different person in a few years.  
__2. I have not been my true self much lately. 
__3.  Lately I have not been acting in the ways I know I should. 
__4. My thought is often hazy and not clearly formed. 
__5. I am lately more and more confused. 
__6. Most of the talking that people do really concerns nothing but a few issues. 
__7. I suffer from deep feelings of guilt. 
__8. Almost all of a person’s behavior can be predicted from knowledge of a few basic 
characteristics of the person. 
__9. I will basically be the same person in a few years. 
__10. I admit that I enjoy winning even if I have to cheat. 
__11. All thing are because of laws.  Nothing is due to chance or free will. 
__12.  I have lately done a lot of things that were not “like me.” 
__13.  Life is confusing and chaotic to me. 
__14. People are generally confusing to me. 
__15. I am not a very systematic person. 
__16. I feel like my foundations are shifting. 
__17. Much of what people say is nothing but rubbish. 
__18. People are rarely both good and bad.  They tend to be either good or bad.  
__19. I am a highly organized person. 
__20. Winning is everything. 
__21. My mind wanders easily. 
__22. My way of doing things will possibly very different in the future. 
__23. Power is really more important than truth. 
__24. I feel out of tune with those I admire. 
__25. I often seem to think in a disorganized fashion. 
__26. I feel empty inside. 
__27. I think most things that are interesting cannot be described exactly. 
__28. I have not been acting like the person I really am deep inside. 
__29. There is usually only one good way to do something. 
__30. I enjoy manipulating people.  
__31. I anticipate having mostly different friends in the coming year. 
__32. I am just not what I could and should be. 
__33. I often do not tell all I know if it can help me win an argument. 
__34. I do not mind distorting the truth to get my own way.  Business is business. 
__35. Only a fool plays by the rules. 
__36. My health will probably be changing in the near future. 
__37. I regret having let a number of people down. 
__38. I am often very anxious and confused. 
__39. I feel there will be some definite changes in my love life. 
__40. Quite often, I am not sure of who I am. 
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Appendix D 
Kellian Descriptions for Use with the Dynamic Analog Scale 
 
Read both descriptions below.  Each pair of descriptions represents opposite psychological 
experiences (feelings, emotions, states of mind).  Please, read each section carefully.  You will be 
asked to place the names of people you personally know on a scale that ranges from one description 
to its opposite. 
 
1st pair of opposites: A v. B 
 
A:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you feel like you are not able to handle 
the things that life is throwing at you. You also feel like things that you used to take for 
granted are no longer certain and that life suddenly feels confusing and chaotic.  Let’s 
refer to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘A.’   As an example of someone who is 
experiencing high levels of ‘A’, consider a high school senior struggling to envision the  
future after graduation or a married person whose spouse begins to behave unpredictably 
in almost everything he or she does.  
 
B:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you feel like life makes sense, and that 
important aspects of your life are pretty much predictable. In this state of mind, you also 
feel like events in the world unfold in a way you can understand. Let’s refer to this 
feeling or state of mind simply as ‘B.’   As an example of someone else who is 
experiencing high levels of ‘B’, consider a person who has a clear career path and has 
been successful in pursuing that path or a person who has a comfortable sense of how his 
or her future will work out.    
 
2nd pair of opposites: C v. D 
 
C:  Every person has a picture of who he or she is.  There are certain attributes and/or 
behaviors that you value as part of your identity. Consider a state of mind or feeling when 
you are behaving in ways that do not conform to those values, or when you feel that you 
are not “acting like yourself.”  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘C.’ 
For example, someone for whom organized religion is an important part of his identity 
may feel ‘C’ when he does not attend religious services.  Another person who sees 
herself as ‘loyal’ may feel ‘C’ after gossiping behind a friend’s back. 
 
D:  You may, at one point, have been asked to list important things about yourself. Often, 
attributes that we value about ourselves are reflected in the ways in which we describe 
ourselves to others.  Consider a feeling or state of mind that you are likely to experience 
when your behaviors are consistent with the way in which your view yourself.  Let’s refer 
to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘D.’  For example, a person who lists ‘studious’ 
as an important aspect of her personality is likely to feel ‘D’ at a time when she is 
performing very well in school.  Another person who sees himself as ‘kind’ may feel ‘D’ 
while performing an act of charity.  
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3rd pair of opposites: E v. F 
 
E:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you see things as ‘black and white.’  That 
is to say, when you are in this state, you may be convinced that there is only one way to 
interpret events that occur.  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘E.’  For 
example, a person in a state of ‘E’ may assume that people are either all good or all bad, 
and may have difficulty imagining a ‘good’ person doing something bad, or a ‘bad’ 
person doing something good.  Another person in this state may believe that Republicans 
are always right and Democrats are always wrong, or vice versa.   
 
F:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you recognize that certain events may be 
interpreted in a number of ways.  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind simply as ‘F.’  
When you are in a state of ‘F’, you are likely to understand that things are not always 
‘black and white,’ but that there are also many ‘shades of grey,’ so to speak.  For 
example, a person in this state of mind is likely to withhold judgment on another person’s 
seemingly offensive actions because they recognize that there may be a justified reason 
for such behavior.   
 
4th pair of opposites: G v. H 
 
G:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you feel that you are less worthy than 
other people.  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind as ‘G.’ A person who feels ‘G’ 
may be dissatisfied with her physical appearance, her academic performance, or her 
social confidence.  Someone who is in a state of ‘G’ may be greatly distressed by aspects 
of himself that he feels fall short of his ideal self. 
 
H:  Consider a feeling or state of mind in which you feel that you are a worthwhile 
person.  Let’s refer to this feeling or state of mind as ‘H.’ When you are in a state of ‘H,’ 
you feel satisfied that you are not falling too short of your ideal self.  For example, 
someone who feels that she looks and acts in ways that she thinks people should look and 
act may feel ‘H.’ 
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Appendix E 
Role Titles 
 
Your mother or someone who is like a mother to you.  
Your father or someone who is like a father to you. 
Someone who would have navigated this situation better than you.  (A measure of ‘ought self’)   
Some whom you feel would have acted similarly to you if placed in this situation. 
Someone who would have navigated this situation more poorly than you.   
A person whom you avoided during this time, or have specifically avoided speaking to about the 
situation since that time.   
A person to whom you turned for advice regarding this situation, either during or since that time. 
Someone you consider to be successful in the areas in which you desire success.   
Someone whom you consider to be unsuccessful, or whom you feel would not be able to achieve 
success in the area(s) in which you desire success.   
A person whom you admire and aspire to emulate.   
A person you would like to avoid emulating. 
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                       Appendix F 
Part II: Incomplete Sentences 
 
1. (Someone who would have navigated this situation better than you) would have handled 
this situation better than I did because he or she is _________. 
2. (Someone who would have navigated this situation more poorly than you) would have 
handled this situation poorly because he or she is_____________. 
3. Knowing what I know now, if I had to go back and change my behavior during this time, 
I would try to be ____________________. 
4. In order for one to succeed in my area(s) of interest, one must be 
_____________________. 
5. If placed in the same position, (a person whom you admire and aspire to emulate) would 
be __________________. 
6. If placed in a similar position, I think that (a person you would like to avoid emulating) 
would be ____________________. 
 7.   I confided in (a person to whom you turned for advice regarding this situation, either   
             during or since that time) regarding this situation because he or she is  
________________. 
8. If I were to become more like (a person you admire and aspire to emulate), I would need 
to be __________________. 
9. If placed in this situation, I think that (a person you would like to avoid emulating) would 
be ____________________. 
10. If I were to provide one reason why I avoid (a person whom you avoided during this time, 
or have specifically avoided speaking to about the situation since that time) when it 
comes to discussing this situation, it is that he or she is ____________________. 
                           
Appendix G 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved during the past week. Check your response to 
each statement using the scale provided below. 
     
 0                                    1                                          2                                       3 
    Rarely or None Some or a Little Occasionally or a Most or All 
 of the Time of the Time Moderate amount of Time of the time 
 (less than 1 day) (1-2 days) (3-4 days) (5-7 days) 
 
1. During the past week I was bothered by  
    things that usually don't bother me. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
2. During the past week I did not feel like eating; 
    my appetite was poor. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
3. During the past week I felt that I could not shake  
    off the blues even with the help from my family  
    or friends. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
4. During the past week I felt that I was just as good  
    as other people. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
5. During the past week I had trouble keeping my  
    mind on what I was doing. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
6. During the past week I felt depressed. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
7. During the past week I felt that everything I did  
    was an effort. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
8. During the past week I felt hopeful about the  
    future. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
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                                                                                                                            0                                      1                                      2                                             3 
    Rarely or None Some or a Little Occasionally or a Most or All 
 of the Time of the Time Moderate amount of Time of the time 
 (less than 1 day) (1-2 days) (3-4 days) (5-7 days) 
 
 
9. During the past week I thought my life had been  
    a failure. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
10. During the past week I felt fearful. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
11. During the past week my sleep was restless. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
12. During the past week I was happy. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
13. During the past week I talked less than I  
      usually do. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
14. During the past week I felt lonely. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
15. During the past week people were unfriendly. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
16. During the past week I enjoyed life. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
17. During the past week I had crying spells. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
18. During the past week I felt sad. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
19. During the past week I felt that people  
      disliked me. ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
20. During the past week I could not “get going.”                                     ____                   ____                      ____                                 ____ 
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 Table 1 
 
Bivariate Correlations Among Measured Variables    
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
 
         Dil
.20          Dil.35        PCIANX       PCIGUILT      DASANX      DASGUILT      DASCON    DASSE     Self-Esteem     CES-Da       STAI           M             SD 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dil.20               -              .888**        .172*          -.077          .224*           .221*         -.031         -.004          -.324**       .227**         .141           1.374         2.500                                  
 
Dil.35                                    -            .109            -.100          .212*           .189*         -.021         -.053          -.279**       .167             .098             .799         1.858                       
 
PCIANX                                                    -              .685**       .489**        .512**        .108          -.399**      -.375**       .678**         .690**     24.157         5.942                                  
  
PCIGUILT                                                                     -            .480**         .430**         .123         -.450**      -.460           .514**        .525**     26.939         6.447                                   
  
DASANX                                                                                      -                .500**       -.165         -.496**      -.442**       .501**         .405**    -25.877     119.354        
              
DASGUILT                                                                                                          -               .097         -.518**     -.362**        .548**         .422**     30.573     113.169  
 
DASCON                                                                                                                              -           .209           -.116            .043            .037        -79.915     111.724  
 
DASSE                                                                                                                                                   -             .372**       -.425**       -.296**    -31.386       98.555 
 
Self-Esteem                                                                                                                                                          -              -.262**       -.417**         .647           .513 
 
CES-Da                                                                                                                                                                                       -              .669**     16.081         9.445    
 
STAI                                                                                                                                                                                                              -         10.141         2.936 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. PCIANX = Personal Construct Inventory Anxiety subscale (scale ranges from 0-35); PCIGUILT = Personal Construct Inventory Guilt subscale (ranges from 0-40); DASANX = 
Dynamic Analog Scale Anxiety subscale (ranges from -200 to +200); DASGUILT = Dynamic Analog Scale Guilt subscale (ranges from -200 to +200); DASCON = Dynamic Analog 
Scale Constriction/Pre-emption subscale (ranges from -200 to +200); DASSE = Dynamic Analog Scale Self-Esteem subscale (ranges from -200 to +200); Self-esteem = Grid-based 
Self-Esteem index (ranges from -3 to +3); CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Study Depression scale (ranges from 0 to 60); STAI = Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(ranges from 6-24). Analyses did not include unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas and self-discrepancies known to be unobtainable.  N’s range from 117 to 147. 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, a Computed using Spearman’s rho due to significant skew
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Table 2 
 
Hierarchical regression models predicting measures of well-being from self-discrepancies and percent 
dilemmas at the .20 salience level 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                   Step 1                                                    Step 2 
                                       Actual-Ideal Discrepancies            Percent Implicative Dilemmas 
                                     _______________________             _______________________ 
 
                                       R2                F               p≤                R2           R2 ∆         F           p≤       
Dependent Variable                        
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PCIANX                                      .054             7.798          .006           .076        .022       3.231       .074 
 
PCIGUILT                                   .086            12.873          .001           .088       .002          .224       .637 
 
DASANX                                    .054             6.873          .010            .088       .034       4.475        .036   
 
DASGUILT                               .067             8.720          .004           .102        .035       4.699       .032 
     
DASCON                                    .000               .043          .835           .001        .000        .035        .852 
 
DASSE                                        .070             8.864          .004           .073        .002         .282       .596 
 
Self-Esteem                  .465        116.543          .001            .528        .063     17.660       .001 
 
CES-D                          .085          11.759          .001            .094       .009       1.214        .273 
 
STAI                             .097         11.526           .001            .108        .011      1.250       .266 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. PCIANX = Personal Construct Inventory Anxiety subscale; PCIGUILT = Personal Construct Inventory Guilt 
subscale; DASANX = Dynamic Analog Scale Anxiety subscale; DASGUILT = Dynamic Analog Scale Guilt subscale; 
DASCON = Dynamic Analog Scale Constriction/Pre-emption subscale; DASSE = Dynamic Analog Scale Self-Esteem 
subscale; Self-esteem = Grid-based Self-Esteem index; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Study Depression scale; 
STAI = Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory. Analyses did not include unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas and self-
discrepancies known to be unobtainable.  
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Table 3 
 
Hierarchical regression models predicting measures of well-being from self-discrepancies and percent 
dilemmas at the .35 salience level 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                   Step 1                                                    Step 2 
                                       Actual-Ideal Discrepancies            Percent Implicative Dilemmas 
                                     _______________________             _______________________ 
 
                                       R2                F               p≤                R2           R2 ∆         F           p≤       
Dependent Variable                        
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PCIANX                                       .054          7.798             .006            .064        .009        1.353        .247 
 
PCIGUILT                                  .086        12.873             .001            .092        .006          .888        .348 
 
DASANX                                   .054          6.873             .010           .088        .034        4.387        .038 
 
DASGUILT                                .067          8.720             .004            .096       .029         3.785        .054 
     
DASCON                                   .000            .043             .835            .001        .000          .103        .749 
 
DASSE                                       .070          8.864             .004           .076        .006           .756        .386 
 
Self-Esteem                .465       116.543             .001           .522       .057       15.821         .001 
 
CES-D                         .085        11.759             .001           .091       .006           .804         .372 
 
STAI                           .097        11.526              .001           .103       .006           .685         .410 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. PCIANX = Personal Construct Inventory Anxiety subscale; PCIGUILT = Personal Construct Inventory Guilt 
subscale; DASANX = Dynamic Analog Scale Anxiety subscale; DASGUILT = Dynamic Analog Scale Guilt subscale; 
DASCON = Dynamic Analog Scale Constriction/Pre-emption subscale; DASSE = Dynamic Analog Scale Self-Esteem 
subscale; Self-esteem = Grid-based Self-Esteem index; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Study Depression scale; 
STAI = Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory. Analyses did not include unobtainable dilemmas and self-discrepancies 
known to be unobtainable.
 Table 4 
 
Zero-order Correlations Among Kellian/ non-Kellian measures and self-discrepancies contained in implicative dilemmas at all levels of obtainability   
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
 
                                                PCIANX        PCIGUILT         DASANX         DASGUILT            DASCON        DASSE            Self-Esteem    CES-Da         STAI            
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Discrepancies rated 1                         -.050                -.031               .038               -.111               -.092              .105              -.005             -.066          .059 
  
Discrepancies rated 2                         -.015                 .046               .116                .035               -.125              -.042             -.322**         -.033          .105 
                    
Discrepancies rated 3
     
                       .207*               .138               .331**            .246**             .011              -.133            -.414**           .248*        .119 
   
Discrepancies rated 4
     
                       .135                 .047               .002                .106                 .046              -.022             -.107             .213*        .273**                                                    
  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Note. PCIANX = Personal Construct Inventory Anxiety subscale; PCIGUILT = Personal Construct Inventory Guilt subscale; DASANX = Dynamic Analog Scale Anxiety subscale; 
DASGUILT = Dynamic Analog Scale Guilt subscale; DASCON = Dynamic Analog Scale Constriction/Pre-emption subscale; DASSE = Dynamic Analog Scale Self-Esteem subscale; 
Self-esteem = Grid-based Self-Esteem index; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Study Depression scale; STAI = Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, a Computed using Spearman’s rho due to significant skew. 
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 Table 5 
 
Zero-order Correlations Among Kellian/ non-Kellian measures and implicative dilemmas at all levels of obtainability     
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
 
                                   PCIANX         PCIGUILT            DASANX         DASGUILT                DASCON             DASSE            Self-Esteem        CES-Da           STAI            
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
.20 Criterion                                                                                                                                                         
 
Dilemmas at 1                      -.040                 -.030                  -.078                -.077               -.118               -.041             -.119              -.046             -.017                                                                                          
 
Dilemmas at 2                      -.055                  .007                   .057                  .070               -.069              -.079              -.233**           .022              .044 
 
Dilemmas at 3                       .172*                .077                   .224*                .221*             -.031              -.004              -.324**           .227*            .141 
 
Dilemmas at 4                       .119                  .005                  -.061                 .059                 .048               .011              -.107               .213*             .245* 
 
.35 Criterion 
 
Dilemmas at 1                       .002                  .025                  -.037                -.081               -.121               .043              -.070              -.009              -.023 
 
Dilemmas at 2                     -.050                  .001                    .062                 .044                .037              -.043              -.189*             .063               .080 
 
Dilemmas at 3                       .109*                .100                   .212*               .189*             -.021              -.053             -.279*              .167               .098 
  
Dilemmas at 4                       .039                 -.044                  -.117                .002                 .020             -.036              -.035               .116                .142    
    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. PCIANX = Personal Construct Inventory Anxiety subscale; PCIGUILT = Personal Construct Inventory Guilt subscale; DASANX = Dynamic Analog Scale Anxiety subscale; 
DASGUILT = Dynamic Analog Scale Guilt subscale; DASCON = Dynamic Analog Scale Constriction/Pre-emption subscale; DASSE = Dynamic Analog Scale Self-Esteem subscale; 
Self-esteem = Grid-based Self-Esteem index; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Study Depression scale; STAI = Speilberger’s Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, a Computed using Spearman’s rho due to significant skew. 
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 Myself 
 . My Ideal Self 
 . . 1. Mom 
 . . . 2. Marty 
 . . . . 3. Sarah 
 . . . . . 4. Scottie 
 . . . . . . 5. Caroline 
 . . . . . . .  
Happy-go-lucky   -2 0 1 2 -2 0 2 Worried all the time 
Intelligent 1 2 2 2 0 0 -1 Unintelligent 
Inquisitive 1 2 0 -2 -2 1 -1 Not at all curious 
Optimistic -1 1 1 2 2 0 -1 Pessimistic 
Altruistic -1 1 0 0 -2 1 0 Selfish 
         
Figure 1: Complete repertory grid         
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Congruent Construct 
Ideal Self 
Self 
Discrepant Construct 
Self Ideal Self 
Weak in delivering discipline           vs.            Firm in delivering discipline 
            Draconian/heavy-handed             vs.              Offering guidance 
Figure 2:  Implicative Dilemma 
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Figure 3:  Ought-self dilemma 
Congruent Construct 
onstruct 
Ideal Self 
Self
                   Schmoozer                           vs.              No-nonsense 
 
Ought self 
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*When Ideal Self is reported as unobtainable by the subject 
 
Figure 4:  Unobtainable ideal-self dilemma 
Congruent Construct 
Ideal Self 
Self 
Discrepant Construct 
Self 
 
                        Obese                     vs.            Skinny 
Ideal Self* 
                     Vain                     vs.              Accepting of one’s self 
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Figure 5: Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) screen capture
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Scope and Method of Study: Two studies are presented which examined the predictive 
values of three subtypes of implicative dilemmas, cognitive dilemmas developed 
within the framework of George Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Theory.  
Previous research provides evidence that implicative dilemmas, dilemmas in 
which self-discrepancies are maintained due to a cost of resolution, are predictive 
of psychological distress.  Study 1 focuses on two subtypes of implicative 
dilemmas, the classic implicative dilemma and the unobtainable ideal-self 
dilemma.  Participants in study 1 completed a repertory grid task utilizing the 
sentence-completion method of grid elicitation and measures of guilt, depression, 
anxiety and self-esteem as conceptualized by Kelly (1955).  In study 2, 
participants provided anxiety narratives and competency narratives in response to 
prompts.  They then completed two repertory grids, again using the sentence-
completion method of grid elicitation, in which elements and constructs relevant 
to each narrated event were used.  The grids were analyzed to identify ought-self 
dilemmas, dilemmas in which one’s ‘self’ and ‘ideal’ are congruent relative to 
one another, but incongruent relative to the ‘ought self’ particular to each event.  
An analysis was conducted to ascertain whether anxiety grids contained 
significantly higher numbers of ought-self dilemmas than competency grids.         
 
Findings and Conclusions:  Percent classic implicative dilemmas found in repertory grids 
was found to be significant positive predictor depression, anxiety and guilt and a 
significant predictor of self-esteem.  Percent classic implicative dilemmas also 
accounted for a significant amount of variance in depression, guilt, anxiety and 
self-esteem scores above that accounted for by self-discrepancies alone.  The data 
also suggests that unobtainable ideal-self dilemmas may serve an insulatory role 
against psychological distress.  This study provides further evidence that 
implicative dilemmas play a role in psychological well-being and suggests that it 
is useful to differentiate between classic implicative dilemmas and unobtainable 
ideal-self dilemmas.  The results of study 2 indicated no significant difference 
between the numbers of ought-self dilemmas in anxiety versus competency grids.  
This may be due to design limitations that can be resolved in future studies 
regarding ought-self dilemmas.           
